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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXII APRIL, 1937 NUMBER 3
THE INCIDENCE OF JUDICLAL CONTROL
OVER CONGRESSt
HENRY W. EDGERTON
Justice Holmes said: "I do not think the United States would come to
an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think
the Union would be imperilled if we could not make that declaration as to
the laws of the several States."' It may be necessary to national survival
that some national tribunal have authority to decide that acts of state legis-
latures are inconsistent with the Federal Constitution. Judicial supremacy2
over national legislation rests on no such necessity. Whether to preserve,
restrict, or abolish the power of courts to hold acts of Congress void is a
pure question of policy, the answer to which should depend on the character
of the results which the present system has produced and is, therefore, likely
to produce. How and when the system originated, what were the attitudes
of the founding fathers toward it, whether it is in some sense a usurpation
are questions with which scholars have dealt. There has been much dis-
cussion of the relation in which particular constitutional decisions stand to
other decisions and to the original Constitution and its amendments. Little
serious attention has been paid to the practical question of the incidence of
the courts' control over Congress, i.e., its effect or tendency, as between
different social groups and interests." On that point there has been much
summary assertion but little proof.
tThis article was begun in 1922. It was practically completed in the summer of
1936, months before President Roosevelt made his Supreme Court proposal. As is
obvious from its omission of all "New Deal" cases, it was written for no political
purpose.
[The QUARTERLY publishes this article as a pioneer treatment of an important, though
neglected, subject. The opinions and points of view expressed are the author's.-Ed.]
'HoLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1920) pp. 295, 296. It is, of course, true that
many state statutes have been nullified on grounds and with effects quite unrelated to
the supremacy of the nation.
'Compare Professor Haines's title, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(2d ed. 1932).3
"A real attempt to balance the debit and credit side of this institution would require
much laborious investigation and has never been made." Edward S. Corwin, Book Review
Of WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT (1st ed. 1925),
(1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 170, 172. Cf. RALSTON, STUDY AND REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF LAOR UPON JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER LEGISLATURES AS TO CONSTITU-
TIONAL QUESTIONS (2d ed. 1923); FIELD, THE EFFECT OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE (1935) ; BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) ;' PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL.
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A full treatment of this subject would deal with all reported cases in
which any court has held an act of Congress void; the number and character
of the acts which Congress has been deterred from enacting, or encouraged
to enact, 4 by the prospect of judicial review; the uncertainty which often
exists between the passage of a law and the Supreme Court's disposition of
it; the question whether the relative abstinence from political effort of Ameri-
can as compared to European intellectuals is due to the knowledge that
desired legislation, even if its passage is secured, may not become "law." 5
With most of this the present article will not deal. It will consider only
the cases in which the Supreme Court has held an act, or part of an act, of
Congress unconstitutional. Decisions of the same sort by other courts which
were reversed or not passed on by the Supreme Court are too many to be
treated in an article; moreover, they have been relatively local in their
effects. The difficulty of dealing objectively at present with the Supreme
Court's disposition of "New Deal" legislation, and the inherent uncertainty
regarding the effects of much of it, seem sufficient reasons for not considering
statutes passed after March 4, 1933. This article aims to consider briefly
all the cases in which earlier act of Congress have been annulled by the
Supreme Court.
Congress does not contravene the black-and-white clauses of the Consti-
tution, like that which allots two Senators to each State. The conflicts be-
tween Congress and the Court have related to the indefinite clauses, like
those-which deal with interstate commerce, due process, and executive power.
It is familiar that the relation of a law to these broad clauses is not a
matter of fact but a matter of opinion. Congress in all the cases to be con-
sidered, ahd members of the Court in many, differed in opinion from the
majority of the Court. This paper is not concerned with the question whether
the congressional or the judicial opinion seems, in general or in a given
case, the more reasonable. In other words, it is not concerned with the
soundness or propriety, from a technical point of view, of the decisions. It
does not discuss the commerce clause or any other clause of the Constitution.
Neither is it concerned with the backgrounds, beliefs, and desires that led
Congress to pass the laws, or the Court to annul them. There is no question,
in my mind, of the high motives of the Court. I am concerned only with the
practical effects and tendencies of the nullifying decisions. What interests,
individual or social, do they protect; and, conversely, whose ox is gored?
LAW HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Library
of Congress, 1936).
'Doubt was felt as to the constitutionality of taxing the salaries of the President
and of the federal judges, and the view was expressed in Congress that "this question
ought to be raised by Congress, the only power that can raise it, in order that it may
be tested in the Supreme Court, the only power that can decide it." It was raised ac-
cordingly. See 253 U. S. at 248 (1921).5See Laski in (1931) 163 HAR.'ER's p. 129.
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Has judicial supremacy been, on the whole, neutral in its incidence; or has
it tended to protect the interests of a relatively poor and unprivileged major'-
ity on the one hand, or of a relatively well-to-do minority on the other? "
It is always difficult, and usually impossible, to determine how different
things would be if they were not as they are. The effects of the decisions
cannot be fully known. The possibilities in that direction cannot be ex
hausted in one article, or by one man. A vast amount of contemporary
material would need to be studied. Treatises would have to be written,
from a special angle, on all the topics with which the various decisions deal,
including, for example, taxation and trial by jury. This paper is offered
as an introduction to a neglected subject. It deals, for the most part, with
direction rather than distance. If the tendencies of the decisions fit into
a pattern, conclusions not too tentative can be drawn regarding their col-
lective incidence.
This article gives no picture of the total effect or tendency, as between
different social groups or interests, of the Supreme Court's exercise of its
various powers. It makes no such attempt. It is not a study of the Court,
but of one of its functions. How far other groups of cases, in which other
functions were exercised, may have deviated from the pattern of the present
group does not concern us here.
I. CASES SAID TO HAvE CHECKED CONGRESSIONAL VIOLATIONS OF
THE BILL OF RIGHTS
Let us first examine the cases which are cited in support of the prevalent bd-
lief that the Court has defended the Bill of Rights against congressional attack.
A well-known defense of judicial supremacy is Congress, the Constitution,
and the Supreme Court,0 by Mr. Charles Warren. Warren supports the
Court's power over Congress chiefly on historical and theoretical grounds, but
he also attributes to it two sorts of beneficence in practice: it restrains Con-
gress from invading the functions of the states7 and from "infringements
on personal liberty."8  "An enforceable Bill of Rights," he says, "is essential
to the citizen's liberty." He proceeds: ". . . . it is a solemn fact that,
even in times of comparative freedom from emergency or excitement, Con-
gress, or one of its branches, has violated the provisions of the Bill of Rights
at least ten times since the year 1867; and at least ten times has the Supreme
Court saved the individual against Congressional usurpation of power."' 0
11925, new edition 1935. References herein are to the new edition, which is prac-
tically identical with the first edition except that a chapter has been added. "The ablest
defense of judicial review is that of Warren, C., Congress, the Constitution, and the
Supreme Court." CUsHiaAN, TEE SUPREmE COURT AND TE CONSTITUTION (1936)
p. 36.
7Pp. 154 g.
'P. 152.
'P. 149.
"P. 150. "By the most favorable interpretation, about ten cases are usually listed in
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To call legislation a federal invasion of state functions tells us nothing
about its social bearing. Trespassing governments may go to the right or to
the left. To say that legislation invades "the citizen's liberty", or "violates
the Bill of Rights", likewise tells us nothing. "Liberties" and "rights" are
many and conflicting; it is necessary to know which are invaded. What is
bad ,for the goose may be very good for the gander. It would be hard to
devise, and impossible to pass, legislation injurious to all concerned.
Of Warren's ten cases of violation of the Bill of Rights, two, as he states,
involved judicial disapproval of action by only one branch of Congress."
As-a single house cannot legislate, these cases are not pertinent to the subject
of judicial supremacy over legislation. This leaves eight cases. Warren
does not discuss them or the interests which they involve; he merely makes
the brief assertions concerning them which I quote below.' 2 These cases
are:13
(1) Boyd v. United States.'4  "Congress has already tried to authorize
illegal searches and seizure of private papers and has only been prevented
by the action of the Supreme Court, in 1886." 15 The facts are quite different
from this picture. The statute authorized a court, in proceedings not crim-
inal arising under the revenue laws, to serve "notice" on a defendant or
claimant to produce papers which the prosecution believed would tend to
prove any allegation made by the United States. The statute provided that
failure to produce the papers in accordance with the notice should be equiva-
lent to a confession of the allegation. In a proceeding to forfeit 35 cases
of plate glass, as imported in violation of the revenue laws, the owners in
-response to such a notice produced certain invoices. Judgment of forfeiture
was reversed by the Supreme Court. The court held the statute unconstitu-
tional, as being within the spirit though not "within the literal terms"'
16 of
both the 4th Amendment, forbidding "unreasonable searches and seizures,"
and the 5th, against compelling one "in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself." That the statute and the action under it were not within
which individual rights were protected by checking Congressional powers. But on close
analysis several of these border on the kind of interpretation which Justice Holmes once
remarked is designed to help criminals to escape just punishment; or, by meticulous
or broad interpretation of certain provisions of the bill of rights, these cases have made
it extremely difficult to secure the information necessary to prevent fraud and to enforce
criminal penalties under federal laws. Other cases included in this list can scarcely be
regarded as rendering protection to individual rights without a rather strained inter-
pretation." HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOcrRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932)
p. 541.
nOp. cit. p. 151.
"Ie also abstracts them, along with the other cases in which the Supreme Court has
overruled Congress, in chapter 10.
"As the ten citations are in a single footnote, and the statements are in the text,
the reader is obliged to determine to which case a given statement refers.
11116 U. S. 616 (1886).
'Op. cit. p. 150.
"116 U. S. at 633.
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the letter of either amendment is clear. Neither search nor seizure, nor
compulsory testimony, nor criminal prosecution was involved. The person
served with the notice could decide for himself whether to produce the
papers, or to permit an unfavorable inference to be drawn from his not
producing them, though no doubt the inference might constitute a powerful
motive in favor of production. The term "notice," rather than order, was
well used in the statute, as the demand for the documents Was not otherwise
enforceable than by the drawing of an unfavorable inference. What the
statute endangered and the decision protected, in the actual case, was the
ownership of thirty-five cases of plate glass. In general, only actual vio-
lators of the revenue laws would have anything to lose -by the fullest ex-
posure of their papers; persons wrongly accused of violations would stand
to gain in these proceedings, though they might sometimes be injured in
other connections, by showing their documents. Accordingly, it may fairly be
said that the decision protected practically nothing except the interests of
smugglers in the profits of smuggling.
(2) Counselinan v. Hitchcock.17 "Congress," says Warren, "has tried to
authorize criminal prosecution of a man after compelling him to testify
before a grand jury, and has only been prevented by the action of the
Supreme Court, in 1892." 18  Counselnian v. Hitchcock is often, but incor-
rectly, included in lists 9 of Supreme Court decisions holding acts of Congress
unconstitutional. The case held nothing unconstitutional but the action of
a federal District Court. A statute20 provided: "No pleading of a party,
nor any discovery or evidence obtained from a party or witness by means
of a judicial proceeding in this or any foreign country, shall be given in
evidence, or in any manner used against him or his property or estate, in
any court of the United States, in any criminal proceeding, or for the en-
forcement of any penalty or forfeiture." In grand jury proceedings against
railroads for violations of the Interstate Commerce Act, a witness refused
to answer questions regarding his acceptance of rebates, on the ground that
it might tend to incriminate him. A district judge committed him for
contempt. The Supreme Court ordered his discharge on habeas corpus, on
the ground that the action of the lower court violated the provision of the
Fifth Amendment that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witnesss against himself." There was, the Supreme Court
pointed out, nothing in the statute to prevent the testimony, which the lower
11142 U. S. 547 (1891).
1BOp. cit. p. 150.
'..g., HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932)
pp. 541, 550; Bullitt, The Supreme Court and Unconstitutional Legislation (1924) 10
A. B. A. J. 419, 425. The case is duly omitted in PROVIsIoNs OF FEDERAL LAW HELD
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Library of Con-
gress, 1936).
IREv. STAT. § 860 (1875).
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court wished to elicit from the witness, from being used "to search out
other testimony to be used in evidence against him . . . in a criminal pro-
ceeding." 21  Therefore, the Supreme Court decided, the lower court in re-
quiring the man to testify violated his constitutional privilege. The Court
held that "the protection of § 860 is not coextensive with the constitutional
provision. ' 22 But as the court observed, "It is to be noted of § 860 of the
Revised Statutes !hat it does not undertake to compel self-criminating evi-
dence."2 The attempted- compulsion was wholly the work of the lower
court, with no encouragement from Congress. True, the Supreme Court
declared that "a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute im-
munity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question
relates" ;24 meaning, obviously, to be a valid justification for compelling self-
criminating evidence, which the statute in queston, in the Court's words,
"does not undertake" to do. The statute "tried to authorize" no criminal
prosecution whatever; on the contrary, it imposed broad restrictions on the
use, in criminal prosecutions, of extorted testimony. The Court's decision
was simply that these restrictions were not so broad as to justify, within
the Constitution, the action of a federal judge in seeking to extort testi-
mony 2 5 There was no conflict between Congress and the Court. The viola-
tion of the Bill of Rights which the Court detected was the work of the
judge.
(3) Justices v. Murray.26  "Congress has tried to authorize the re-trial
in a Federal Court of facts already tried and settled in behalf Of the plain-
tiff in a State Court, and was only prevented by the action of the Supreme
Court, in 1870, in holding the statute unconstitutional."2 7 The scope of the
statute was brief and narrow. It was passed during the Civil War, and was
21142 U. S. at 564.
11id. at 565.2
'
1 d. at 585.
2Id. at 586.
'Shortly after the decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock, and evidently with the lan-
guage of that case in mind, Congress passed a statute (27 STAT. 443, Feb. 11, 1893)
which expressly conferred complete immunity upon witnesses with respect to matters
concerning which they might testify in proceedings under the Interstate Commerce Act,
and expressly deprived witnesses in such proceedings of the excuse of self-crimination.
The statute in its latter aspect was upheld in Brown v. Walker, 161 U. S. 591 (1896).
REv. STAT. § 860 was repealed by an act of May 7, 1910, 36 STAT. 352.
The opinion is frequently expressed that the privilege against self-crimination hampers
justice unnecessarily, and also encourages the third degree. Mr. Charles H. Tuttle,
former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, has said that
"no other obstacle in practice to the prosecution of crime has become more prostituted
with abuses and more 'disastrous in its effects." PROCEEDINGS OF THE GovERNOR'S CON-
FERENCE ON CRIME, THE CRIMINAL AND SOCIETY (Albany, 1935) p. 74. Mr. Ferdinand
Pecora, former Acting District Attorney of New York County, has said that the
privilege, "in every case -where it is claimed in good faith, is a refuge for a wrongdoer
and not' for an innocent man." PROCEEDINGS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE
ON CRIME (Washington, 1934)" p. 171.
9 Wall. 274 (U. S. 1870).
VRA.REN, op. Cit., p. 150.
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expressly made applicable only "during the present rebellion. ' 2  It per-
mitted either party to remove to a federal court, for retrial, after final judg-
ment in a state court, cases against federal officers and cases based on
arrest or imprisonment under color of presidential authority. Although other
language of the statute applied to criminal proceedings, the language in-
volved in the Murray case related to civil proceedings and, therefore, in-
volved no possibility of double jeopardy. Plaintiff had judgment for battery
and false arrest, in a New York court, against a United States marshal and
his deputy. The defendants sought to remove the case. The Court held
the statute invalid under the 7th Amendment: "No fact tried by a jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than accord-
ing to the common law." The interest which the Court defended was that
of a small class of persons, during a short time, in keeping a narrow class
of controversies out of the federal courts in particular circumstances: viz.,
when the controversies had reached final judgment in a state court. We
have no reason to believe that the federal courts, with the Supreme Court
at their head, were so bad that the privilege of having a dispute settled
elsewhere was of large importance; and as the Court upholds provisions for
the removal of suits, during their earlier stages, to the federal courts, the
support which the Court gave to the interest of parties in having certain
suits settled where they were begun was very limited. On the other hand,
the decision facilitated the final settlement of the controversies involved.
(4) Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States.2 9 "Congress has
attempted to take property for public use without due and full compensation,
and has only been prevented by the action of the Supreme Court, in 1893."30
The "property" involved was peculiar. In connection with the completion
by the government of dam No. 8 in the Monongahela River, Congress made
provision for the purchase from the Monongahela Navigation Company, by
condemnation if necessary, of lock and dam No. 7; with a proviso that "in
estimating the sum to be paid by the United States, the franchise of said
corporation to collect tolls shall not be considered." The lock and dam were
to be thrown open, after their acquisition, to free navigation. In condemna-
tion proceedings the trial court awarded the company $209,000 for its lock
and dam, but, in compliance with the statute, expressly disregarded the value
of the toll franchise. The Supreme Court granted a new trial, on the ground
that condemnation without payment for the franchise was taking property
for public use without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment.
A franchise is commonly a gift from the government. If the grantee is
1'12 STAT. 756 c. 81, § 5 (1863).
N148 U. S. 312 (1893).
'WARREN, op. cit., p. 150.
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permitted, during the continuance of the franchise, to charge for the use of
its facilities no more than a reasonable return upon the cost of producing or
of reproducing them, the franchise acquires no "value", whether in the
sense of earning power or of exchange value. A franchise "value" is simply
the capitalization of a privilege of charging rates which will produce some
return on the public gift to the company. By insisting upon a franchise
value, the Court in the Monongahela case in effect recognized such a privi-
lege. The Court simultaneously created and defended against congressional
attack the right and liberty of the few franchise holders to receive, and
of the many consumers and taxpayers to pay, this return upon the public
gift.
The case was decided before the era of regulation of public utility rates,
and the Court did not discuss the question of allowing a franchise value as
an element in valuation for the purposes of a rate base. Directly and in-
directly, however, during a considerable time, the plain implications of the
case led various courts and commissions, though by no means all, to decide
the rate question in the company's favor.3 1 The Supreme Court itself, in
Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Company,8 2 decided that in view of certain
special New York legislation, the company involved was entitled to insist
on a franchise value as part of its rate base. The Monongahela case was
cited and relied on.83 In more recent cases the Court has excluded franchise
value from the rate base, and probably most courts and commissions now
do the same;34 but in some instances it is hard to distinguish the "going
concern value", which the Court allows, from a franchise value.3 5
(5) Wong Wing v. United States.86 "Congress has attempted to author-
ize imprisonment of persons at hard labor without an indictment by a grand
jury, and has only been prevented by the action of the Supreme Court, in
1890."37 The statute provided that a Chinese adjudged to be unlawfully in
the United States should be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than
one year, and that the adjudication might be by a United States Commis-
sioner. A Chinese, sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment at hard labor
in consequence of such an adjudication, was released by the Supreme Court on
habeas corpus, on the grounds that the Sixth Amendment requires a judicial
trial before a criminal sentence, and that the requirement in the Fifth Amend-
'See early cases collected in WHITTEN, VALUATION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS
(Supp. 1914) pp. 1298-1315.
-212 U. S. 19 (1909).
1Id. at 44.
'Clarks Ferry Bridge Co. v. Public Service Comm. of Pennsylvania, 291 U. S. 227
(1934). United Railways and Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234 (1930),
is clearly distinguishable. See cases collected in ROBINSON, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITIES
(2d ed. 1935) p. 448.
'E. g., McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400 (1926).
-%163 U. S. 228 (1896).
WARREN, op. cit., p. 151. "1890" appears to be an error for "1896."
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ment of indictment by a grand jury in cases of "infamous crime" applies
to a crime punishable by imprisonment at hard labor. That Chinese standi
a better chance with grand juries, trial juries, and judges than with United
States Commissioners is not clear, but seems likely. If so, the interest in,
bodily freedom of one small group composed chiefly of poor persons was
protected by the Court against congressional attack. The Court had held that
Chinese immigrants might be deported without judicial proceedings ;3 and
the theory of the statute in the Wong Wing case was not that citizens might
be deprived of indictment and jury trial in criminal cases, but that aliens
might be deprived. The passage of the statute evinced no tendency on
the part of Congress to deprive persons generally, or even immigrants gen-
erally, of those privileges. To the "rights" and "liberties" of the great
mass of the population the statute in itself meant nothing. However, the
court relied largely on the Wong Wing case in sustaining, in United States.
v. Moreland,39 a citizen's objection to a jury sentence to hard labor without
indictment. The case was also relied on in Truax v. Raich,40 which held
that aliens were deprived of the equal protection of the laws by a state
statute requiring employers to employ four citizens to one alien.
(6) Kirby v. United States.41  "Congress has attempted to violate the
provision of the Constitution requiring the defendant in a criminal prosecu-
tion to be confronted with the witnesses against him; the citizen's rights.
were preserved by the Court, in 1899."42
To convict a man of receiving stolen goods, it must be proved that the
goods received were, in fact, stolen. A statute provided that in prosecutions
for knowingly receiving stolen property of the United States, the previous.
conviction, on a separate prosecution, of the thief should be conclusive evi-
dence that the property was stolen. In a trial for receiving stolen postage
stamps, the record of the thief's conviction was admitted. The defendant
was convicted of receiving, and the Supreme Court, two justices dissenting,
ordered a new trial on the ground that the statute violated the requirement
of the Sixth Amendment that the accused in criminal prosecutions "be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." Probably such benefit as the deci-
sion conferred upon defendants was conferred chiefly upon poor men.
"It is quite a valuable right to a prisoner to be confronted upon his trial
with the witnesses against him, so that he may cross-examine them and the
jury see them and thus judge of their credibility." 48  But neither the right
'Lem Sing Moon v. United States, 158 U. S. 538 (1895).
'Infra note 70.
l239 U. S. 33 (1915).
1174 U. S. 47 (1899).
"uWARREN, op. cit., P. 151.
"Earl, J., in People v. Fish, 125 N. Y. 150 (1891), quoted in WiGauoRE, EviDENC=.
(2d ed. 1923) § 1395.
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.of cross-examination nor the right to have the court see and hear the witness
is absolute. Every exception to the hearsay rule, e.g., the admission of
dyiqg declarations, is an exception to the right of confrontation. 44 The fur-
ther exception which the statute in the Kirby case undertook to set up is
trifling and harmless. The statute required the government to establish, in
addition to the previous theft of the goods, (1) that the defendant received
the goods, (2) "with intent to convert to his own use or gain," and (3)
"knowing the same to have been so embezzled, stolen or purloined." 45  If
one "knows" the goods are stolen, necessarily he believes they are stolen.
Even if a receiver's belief that the goods are stolen is erroneous, his con-
duct in receiving them, believing them to be stolen, is so anti-social that it
may well be penalized. 46 No attack was made, in the Kirby case, upon the
evidence which must have convinced the jury that the defendant believed the
goods to have been stolen. If Congress had chosen, directly and expressly,
to make it a crime to receive goods believing them to have been stolen, the
defendant would have had no cause of complaint; because the guilt of the
thief, which in the actual case was material but improperly established, would
hiave been immaterial. It is arguable that Congress did in substance, al-
though not directly and expressly, make receiving with belief a crime, since
it added a requirement of actual theft and then supplied that requirement by
a conclusive presumption. But I am not suggesting that the Court's decision
is wrong. I am suggesting merely that it is unimportant. The only persons
endangered by the statute or protected by the decision were persons proved
by proper evidence to have received for their own profit goods which they
believed to have been stolen.47 The only thing against which those persons
were protected was circuity in the method by which Congress sought to
penalize their conduct.
(7) United States v. Evans.48  "Congress has attempted to allow an
appeal by the Government in a criminal trial after the accused has been found
not guilty by a jury, and was prevented by the Supreme Court, in 1909." 4 9
This statement conveys the impression that the "appeal by the Government"
which the Court prevented was an appeal in the ordinary sense, a proceeding
which might lead to a reversal of the judgment of acquittal. The so-called
"appeal" had no such character; this was, in fact, the very ground on
"Cf. WIG1,1ORE, Ot'. cit., § 1397.
"18 STAT. 479. The entire clause was repealed in 1909 by 35 STAT. 1155.
"It amounts to an attempt to receive stolen goods, People v. Jaffe, 185 N. Y. 497
(1906), to the contrary notwithstanding. Even if the curious reasoning of the Jaffe
case were accepted, the somewhat anti-social character of the receiver's conduct would
still be evident.
7Except to the extent that the jury may be prejudiced, in regard to the defendant's
belief, by being told that another person committed a crime.
"213 U. S. 297 (1909).
"WARE , op. cit. p. 151.
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which the Court held the statute invalid.50 The statute authorized "appeals"
by the government, but it provided expressly that these proceedings were
not to result in setting aside a verdict for the defendant. The only pur-
pose and the only possible effect of the statutory "appeal" was the establish-
ment of a precedent, a rule for future cases. The defendant was in no way
interested in the result of the appeal. The Supreme Court decided nothing
whatever with regard to the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings.
It decided merely that a review of the proceedings in the lower court for
the sole purpose of establishing a precedent for the future is not in its
nature judicial, and that Congress has no authority to enlarge the Court's
jurisdiction to cover non-judicial proceedings. 51 Any possible benefit from
the decision was restricted to future defendants, and dependent on remote
contingencies.
(8) Ex parte Garland.5 2 "Congress has attempted to make a crime out
of an act which was not a crime when it was committed, and by an ex
post facto law to punish a man for committing such an act; it was prevented
by the Supreme Court, in 1867."53 Warren cites the case, also, as one ir
which Congress violated the constitutional prohibition against bills of at-
tainder.54  All this intimates that Congress undertook to subject persons
to fine or imprisonment, without a judicial trial, for acts which were not
punishable when performed. In fact, the statute imposed neither fine nor
imprisonment, but merely exclusion from federal office and from practice
in federal courts; and the acts of the petitioner, when performed, were
punishable as treason. In 1862 Congress passed an act which required'
persons elected or appointed to office under the United States to take oath,
to a number of facts, including "that I have never voluntarily borne arms
against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have
voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons
engaged in armed hostility thereto; that I have neither sought nor accepted,
nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any-
authority or pretended authority in hostility to the United States." 55 In
January, 1865, the requirements of this act were extended to persons prac-
ticing in the courts of the United States.5 6 Garland, who had previously
been admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court, served throughout the Civil
'In his digest of the case on page 322 Warren states its true character.
'Buiwicg, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) p. 134. If Congress
should pass a statute allowing the government a real appeal in criminal cases, dicta of the-
majority of the-Court in Kepner v. United States, 195 U. S. 100 (1904) indicate that it
might be held unconstitutional.
4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867).
'WTARREN, op. cit., p. 151.
"Id. at 152.
'12 STAT. 502.
513 STAT. 424.
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War in the Confederate Congress. In July, 1865, Garland received a full
pardon from the President. He then sought permission from the Court to
resume his practice before it without taking the statutory oath. The Court,
by a vote of five to four, granted his petition, on the grounds that the
act of Congress, as applied to the petitioner, was (1) a bill of attainder,
(2) an ex post facto law, and (3) an infringement of the pardoning power
of the President. It is probably true, as the majority opinion asserts, that
some of the clauses of the statutory oath might cover acts which did not
constitute treason; but it seems obvious that the members of the Confederate
Congress, as they made appropriations and other provisions for the conduct
of the Civil War, were in the legal theory of the United States as much
engaged in treason against the United States, "in levying war against them,
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort," as the
Confederate generals in the field.5 6' As Mr. Garland, apart from the pardon,
might have been executed for treason, it seems odd that he might not be
excluded from practice in United States courts. The "bill of attainder"
idea is scarcely more tenable than the er post facto idea. Neither is perti-
nent except where punishment is inflicted. The four dissenting justices
confended with force that the requirement of an oath to past loyalty as a
condition precedent to practicing law is not a punishment, but simply a quali-
fication, like good moral character, which Congress might prescribe as neces-
sary to a lawyer.57 And if the oath requirement was a qualification and
not a punishment, no presidential pardon could dispense with it.5
There is every likelihood that Congress would soon have repealed so
much of the Act of 1865 as the Court annulled in the Garland case. In
1867, when the case was decided, the war fever had begun to subside. In
July, 1868, Congress amended the Act of 1862 so as to permit ex-Con-
federates from whom disabilities had been removed by act of Congress
to qualify for federal office by an oath which omitted all reference to their
past conduct ;59 and in February, 1871, the same privilege was extended to
all ex-Confederates not ineligible to office by reason of the 14th Amend-
ment.60 It is unlikely that the exclusion of such men from practice in United
States courts would have been allowed to continue longer, if the Supreme
Court had allowed it to continue so long. In the meantime the decision
served the interests of office-holders and lawyers.
""The government never frankly renounced its position that all Confederates making
war on the United States were traitors ...but circumstances forced the treatment of
these persons virtually as citizens or subjects of a recognized foreign state." CUMMINGS
AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937), p. 195. After the war Jefferson Davis was
indicted, but never tried. Id. at 207, 208.
74 Wall. at 396, 397.
18Id. at 397.
15 STAT. 85.
16 STAT. 412.
JUDICIAL CONTROL OVER CONGRESS
"Declamation," as Mr. Warren says in his preface, "must bow before
history and actual cases." The cases he cites give small support to the
theory that Congress has attacked, and judicial supremacy defended, "the
citizen's liberty". But there are many other decisions in which the Supreme
Court has overruled Congress. It remains to consider what interests those
decisions protected. As was said at the outset, this paper is not concerned
with the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the decisions in the light
of the commerce clause or other clauses of the Constitution; it is concerned
only with their effects and tendencies.
II. CASES IN WlICH JUDICIAL SUPREMACY PROTECTED THE GOVERNMENT
AGAINST THE CITIZEN
While judicial supremacy frequently operates to protect some sort of citi-
zen against some sort of governmental action, there are instances in which
it protects the government against the citizen. The leading case of Marbury
v. Madison,6' on its face, was of that sort. An act of Congress authorized the
Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to persons holding federal office.
At the beginning of March, 1801, in the last days of the Adams administration,
commissions as Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia had been
signed by the President, sealed by John Marshall as Acting Secretary of
State, and confirmed by the Senate. They had not been delivered when
Jefferson became President, and he ordered Madison, his Secretary of
State, to withhold them. Application was made to the Court for a writ,
directed to the Secretary of State, to compel the issuance of the commis-
sions. The Court considered that the appointments were complete, that
the appropriate evidence was wrongfully withheld, and that a competent
court could direct the Secretary of State to issue it; but relief was refused on
the ground that the statute was an unconstitutional attempt to enlarge the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
The enormous importance of the decision lies, of course, in its establish-
ment of the doctrine that a court may declare an act of Congress unconstitu-
tional. The circumstances of the case are not congenial to the view that
judicial review of legislation protects "the rights and liberties of the indi-
vidual". On the contrary; confronted by a situation in which the Court
declared that the rights of an individual were being denied by the executive,
the doctrine of judicial review served precisely as a justification for refusing
to give to the individual the protection which Congress sought to provide.
On its surface the decision denied protection both to the petitioner's private
interests and to the social interests in security and orderly government, since
it permitted the Secretary of State to persist in what the Court declared to be
I Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
312 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
his unlawful refusal to deliver to Marbury the commission to which he was;
entitled. Probably none of these things is, as a practical matter, chargeable
to the decision, since an opposite decision, ordering the delivery of the com-
mission, would have been flouted by Jefferson and his administration.62
The statute under which Marbury had been appointed, with the consent
of the Senate, to be a Justice of the Peace in the District of Columbia, de-
fined the term of office as five years and contained no provisions for removal.
The opinion assumed, necessarily and explicity, that such an officer was
not removable at the will of the executive. Some 123 years later, in Myers
v. United States,6 3 the court decided by a vote of six to three that a post-
master, appointed for four years with the consent of the Senate, was remov-
able by the President, and that a statute which undertook to require the con-
sent of the Senate to the removal was unconstitutional as an attempt to.
invade the President's "executive power". Similar statutes had been in un-
questioned effect for many years. The net effect of the Myers doctrine on
the interests of the public was probably favorable. It promoted discipline
and harmony, and sacrificed independence, in the public service. But by
putting the tenure of large classes of appointees at the mercy of the Presi-
dent, it evidently consecrated executive disregard of individual interests which
the statute had sought to protect.
The Myers case practically overruled Marbury v. Madison with regard to
the President's power to remove an officer appointed fo a fixed term with
the consent of the Senate. Marbury v. Madison rested on the premise that
the President had no such power, although Congress had not denied it
to him; the Myers case decided that he had it even when Congress had
sought to deprive him of it. It is a curious paradox that in each of the two
contradictory cases the unconstitutionality of a statute was the Court's
ground for denying relief to the ousted office-holder. With surprising ver-
satility, judicial supremacy served to defeat him in both.64
In Gordon v. United States,65 a divided court briefly held unconstitutional
a statute which gave it jurisdiction of appeals from the Court of Claims,
and on that ground dismissed the claimant's appeal. The theory of the de-
cision appears in a memorandum of Taney, C. J., printed many years later ;06
6'3 bEVERIDGE, LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL, p. 125; CUSHmAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS (3d ed. 1932). p. 156.
6272 U. S. 52 (1926).
"In Humphrey's Executor (Rathbun) v. United States, 295 U. S. 602 (1935), the-
Court upheld the power of Congress to impose reasonable restrictions on the President's
authority to remove quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative officers. The doctrine of the
Myers case now seems to be confined to purely executive officers. See Donovan and.
Irvine, The President's Power to Remove Members of Administrative Agencies (1936)
21 CORNELL L. Q. 215.
'"2 Wall. 561 (U. S. 1865). There is a slightly fuller report in 17 L. Ed. 921.
117 U. S. 697, appendix.
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that as the sums which the Court of Claims found due were to be paid only
in case the Secretary of the Treasury estimated an appropriation for their
payment, the court's orders had not the finality of judicial acts. Its imme-
diate effect was to support public or governmental interests at the expense
of individual interests. Its total effect, however, was balanced, as its doctrine
deprived the government as well as the claimants of the statutory appeal
in future cases. Its effect was also brief. Congress soon repealed the
requirement of an estimate,6 7 and the Supreme Court thereafter took full
jurisdiction of appeals from the Court of Claims.6 8
IIl. CASES IN WHICHE JUDICIAL SUPREMACY OFFERED APPARENT PRO-
TECTION, IN A LIMITED LOCALITY, AGAINST FINE OR IMPRISONMENT
The Supreme Court has taken exception to the criminal procedure pre-
scribed.by Congress in two statutes local to the District of Columbia and one
statute local to Alaska. Congress is both a national legislature and the
local legislature of the several territories, and it was functioning in these
instances not as a national but as a local legislature. These statutes and the
decisions which annulled them cannot be counted as instances in which
Congress attacked and the court defended the "liberty" of citizens generally.
Moreover, in each instance the protection which the Court gave, even in
the locality affected, was apparent rather than real.
Statutes 9 permitted prosecutions based on information (as distinguished
from indictment) in the District of Columbia for neglecting to provide for
minor children. The punishment authorized was a fine of not more than
$500, or imprisonment at hard labor in the workhouse of the District for
not more than twelve months, or both. A defendant was convicted in the
Juvenile Court of the District, and sentenced to six months' hard labor in
the workhouse. In United States v. Moreland70 the Supreme Court, three
justices dissenting, affirmed the action of the Court of Appeals in reversing
the conviction. Although the workhouse in question had neither walls,
bars, nor uniform, the majority held that the authorized punishment made
the crime "infamous" and, therefore, brought it within the provision of the
5th Amendment that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on the presentment or indictment of a
grand jury." The Court's action in requiring an indictment for a compara-
tively petty crime theoretically protected in some degree the personal liberty
both of guilty persons and of such innocent persons as a district attorney
"Act of Mar. 17, 1866, 14 STAT. 9.
'Rules, 3 Wall. vii; De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419 (U. S. 1866) ; United
States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 144 (U. S. 1871).
134 STAT. 86; 34 STAT. 73; 37 STAT. 136.
-258 U. S. 433 (1922).
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might wish to prosecute but be unable to indict. Yet the only persons who
could be saved from punishment by the requirement of an indictment would
be those against whom, as against the defendant in the Moreland case, there
was enough evidence to convince a trial jury beyond a reasonable doubt that
they were guilty of failing to provide for their minor children (or other
crime similarly punishable). It is easier to indict than to convict. Many
men are indicted who cannot be convicted; and, if a man can be convicted,
the lesser preliminary hurdle of indictment is commonly an easy one for the
prosecution to take. It follows that the protection which the decision gave
was formal rather than substantial.
In Rasmussen v. United States71 plaintiff in error was convicted in Alaska
of keeping a disorderly house. The Code for Alaska 72 permitted trial for
misdemeanor by a jury of six, and Rasmussen was convicted by such a jury.
The Supreme Court granted a new trial. It held that a "jury", in the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of jury trial, meant twelve men. Here the defendant,
after being duly indicted, was tried by a short jury, while in the Moreland
case the defendant was not indicted but was tried by a full jury. The evi-
dence convinced first a grand jury, and then a short trial jury, of Rasmus-
sen's guilt. To the extent of the likelihood, if any, that a man who will be
indicted by a grand jury and condemned by) a jury of six will not be con-
demned by a jury of twelve, the decision protected the interests of defen-
dants. But a defendant's chance is not necessarily better with a jury of
twelve than with a jury of six. Each juryman's actual share of responsi-
bility increases as the number of jurymen diminishes. His sense of responsi-
bility, and his reluctance to convict, may increase in like or greater propor-
tion. The Rasmussen case, then, like the Moreland case, gave a formal and
not a substantial protection.
In Callan v. Wilson78 the statute provided that in the District of Columbia
"prosecutions in the police court shall be by information under oath, with-
out indictment by grand jury or trial by petit jury." Appeals were per-
mitted to the Supreme Court of the District, with a jury trial in that court.74
Callan, a member of a musicians' union, was convicted in the police court,
without indictment or jury trial, of "conspiracy", for participating in the
boycotting of fellow-members who failed to conform to the union's require-
ments. On default in the payment of a fine of $25, he was sentenced to
thirty days in jail. He did not exercise his right of appeal to the Supreme
Court of the District. The United States Supreme Court ordered his dis-
charge on habeas corpus, on the ground that the statute and the proceedings
1197 U. S. 516 (1905).
"§ 171, 31 STAT. 321, 359.
"127 U. S. 540 (1888).
I'D. C. REv. STAT. §§ 1064, 773.
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under it deprived him of his constitutional right to a jury trial of "all
crimes, except in cases of impeachment." 75 As the statute permitted appeals
in all cases, with jury trial on appeal, the statutory denial of! a jury was of
a most attenuated sort. One who wished a jury trial could get it under the
statutory scheme. As the opinion points out, numerous courts had held that
jury trial is sufficiently allowed if it is allowed on appeal. While it hap-
pened that the petitioner was a union man and the complaint against him
arose out of union activity, the statute, and so the effect of the decision,
applied indifferently to all sorts of prosecutions in police court.
Neither indictment nor a petty jury is necessary to a fair trial, even in
the case of serious crimes. Neither stands on any broader constitutional basis
than the technical one that, in certain situations, it is specifically prescribed by
federal or state constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized this. In
Maxwell v. Dow,7 "' a man had been tried in a state court for robbery, by
a jury of eight, and tried on information instead of indictment. He was
sentenced to eighteen years' imprisonment. As the express requirements of
the United States Constitution regarding indictment and juries are not ap-
plicable in state courts, the United States Supreme Court, in habeas corpus
proceedings, sustained the conviction and sentence. It held that the absence
of indictment and of the common-law jury constituted neither a denial of
due process of law nor an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States. Consistently with the 14th amendment, "trial
by jury may be abolished. ' '75b
If the Moreland, Rasmussen, and Callan cases were in fact measurably
good for defendants, which seems very doubtful, it follows that they meas-
urably defeated the social interest in the cheap and simple administration of
justice and in the discouragement of criminal conduct. Guilt is never cer-
tain. No one who has read Professor Borchard's Convicting the Innocent
can forget that the traditional system of grand jury and petty jury makes
its mistakes. The probability of guilt is only a little less or a little greater
in the case of men convicted as these defendants were convicted than in the
case of men indicted and convicted in the traditional way.
The statutes involved in the Wong Wing case76 and the Kirby case77 were
not limited to the District of Columbia; but the Wong Wing statute was
limited to Chinese, and the Kirby statute was limited to receivers of stolen
goods. The nature of those two statutes makes it likely that the majority of the
potential beneficiaries of those decisions are poor persons. On the other
nArt. III, § 2.
-176 U. S. 581 (1888).
'Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 105 (1934).
"SSupra note 36.
nSupra note 41.
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hand, a defendant who can afford a good lawyer is more likely than another
to derive advantage from any of these five decisions on criminal procedure,
and only a small minority of persons of whatever social group ever find
themselves in a position to be affected by them. Of these five cases, each
annulled legislation confined either to Chinese, to receivers, to the District
of Columbia, or to Alaska; and none of them, with the uncertain exception of
the Wcng Wing case, offered substantial protection to any one.
IV. CASES IN WHICH JUDICIAL SUPREMACY PROTECTED HARMFUL
BUSINESS ACTIVITY, ETC.
In the large majority of the cases in which the Supreme Court, by anul-
ling acts of Congress, has protected persons from fine or imprisonment, the
statutes involved have been directed specifically against certain business
activities, or other activities which cannot be carried on without money.78
In most of these cases, the court found no fault with the machinery provided
by Congress for determining guilt. Necessarily, the persons chiefly benefited
by these decisions have been the owners of businesses, though in some in-
stances, no doubt, benefits have extended to employees.
Newberry v. United States79 dealt with a statute ° which forbade the
expenditure of more than $5000 by a candidate for Representative, or of
mote than $10,000 by a candidate for Senator, or of any sum forbidden by
State law, "in any campaign for his nomination and election". Mr. Newberry
and others were convicted of conspiracy to violate this statute by spending
$100,000 "in procuring his nomination and election . .. at said primary and
general elections". The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. Four of
the justices thought the legislation constitutional. Five held that it was un-
constitutional, on the ground that Article I, Section 4, of the Constitution,
which gives Congress control over "the times, places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives," does not cover nominations.
The statute was passed before the Seventeenth Amendment which provided
for popular election of Senators; and of the five concurring justices one ex-
pressly reserved judgment on the question whether a like statute passed
after the Amendment would be valid. The decision protected, in some de-
gree, the interest of wealthy persons in buying nominations. Although it
did not foreclose the question of the power of Congress under the Amend-
ment, Congress expressly made the Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 inappli-
cable to "primary" elections or conventions.8 '
nlThe Boyd case, supra note 14, falls into the present category.
"256 U. S. 232 (1921).
136 STAT. 822, 37 STAT. 25-29.143 STAT. 1070.
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In a considerable series of cases the conduct which judicial supremacy
protected against penalties consisted in the operation of a harmful business.
In Keller v. United States,82 as in the Rasmussen case,8 3 judicial supremacy
protected an exploiter of prostitutes. The defendants were indicted and
convicted under a statute84 which made it a felony to keep any alien woman
or girl, for purposes of prostitution, within three years after her entry into
the United States. A divided court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the matter was within the general police power, which had not been
conferred upon the federal government.8 5 justice Holmes, for the minority,
took the view that authority to exclude aliens carries with it, as incidental, the
power not only to deport a woman who practices prostitution soon after
entry but also to punish those who cooperate with her in so doing.
The statute involved in United States v. Dewitt 6 prohibited the sale of
illuminating petroleum inflammable at a lower temperature than 110 degrees;
also of naphtha and illuminating oils in combination. The defendant was
indicted for violation of this act. The Supreme Court held the act invalid,
within the limits of a state, as being a police regulation, not incidental to any
power granted to Congress. The social and individual interests in the
physical safety of persons and property were denied the protection which
Congress had tried to give them. The interest which was protected was
the economic interest of the defendant and others in carrying on with im-
punity an anti-social traffic.
Three of the cases protected the liquor trade. In Matter of Heff,8t a
statutes prohibited selling liquor to Indians, including those whose allotment
of land had been made and was being held in trust for them by the govern-
ment. Another statute made such Indians citizens. Heff was convicted of
selling liquor to such an Indian. The Supreme Court, Justice Holmes
dissenting, released Heff on habeas corpus, on the ground that an Indian
upon whom citizenship had been conferred was not a member of an Indian
tribe within the meaning of the clause of the Constitution 9 which permits
Congress to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes". There is a wide-
spread belief that liquor is bad for Indians. The decision protected indirect-
ly the interest of Indians in getting liquor, and directly the interest of deal-
ers in selling them liquor; it denied protection to the supposed socal interest
-213 U. S. 138 (1909).
'Supra note 71.8134 STAT. 899, § 3.
'After the decision was rendered, Congress amended the act so as to restrict the
penal clause to the exploitation of aliens who had been imported for immoral purposes
(Mar. 26, 1910, c. 128, § 2, 36 STAT. 263, 264). In Brolan v. United States, 236 U. S. 216,
221 (1915), the Court intimated that this change had cured the invalidity of the statute.
849 Wall. 41 (U. S. 1869), 14 STAT. 484.
87197 U. S. 488 (1905).
129 STAT. 506.
"'Art. I, § 8.
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in preventing the transaction. Eleven years later in United States v. Nice,90
the decision was expressly overruled and an indictment sustained, on the
ground that "Citizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued
guardianship." Lipke v. Lederer9' was decided in the time of the Eighteenth
Amendment. The National Prohibition Act 92 imposed upon the illegal manu-
facture or sale of liquor a "tax . . . in double the amount now provided by
law, with an additional penalty of $500 on retail dealers". An alleged
illegal dealer, while under indictment, was threatened by the Collector of
Internal Revenue with the seizure and sale of property to collect $45.83 tax,
$500 "penalty" under this section, and a small "penalty" under another
section. The Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, granted the dealer an
injunction which restrained the threatened collection, on the ground that
the statute deprived him of due process because it made no provision for a
hearing. The decision apparently protected against administrative attack
under congressional authority the economic interests of illicit liquor dealers,
and correspondingly denied protection to the social interest, which was then
officially supposed to exist, in suppressing the trade. The third case involv-
ing the liquor trade is United States v. Constantine.921
In a number of instances the Supreme Court's review of federal leg-
islation has protected anti-social methods in connection with otherwise
legitimate business. In United States v. Fox,93 a statute undertook to punish
with imprisonment any person respecting whom bankruptcy proceedings were
commenced, who, within three months before their commencement, "under
the false color and pretense of carrying on business and dealing in the ordi-
nary course of trade, obtains on credit from any person any goods or chattels
with intent to defraud." 94 The defendant filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, and was thereupon indicted under this section. The court held it
unconstitutional. It was not confined to acts in contemplation of bankruptcy,
and the Court took the position that an act which, when done, had no relation
to bankruptcy or any other matter of federal jurisdiction, could not be turned
into a federal crime by the subsequent occurrence of bankruptcy. The inter-
est served by the decision is that of individual bankrupts in immunity from
federal criminal responsibility for obtaining goods by false pretenses. The
social interest in discouraging persons on the verge of bankruptcy from ob-
taining goods by false pretenses, and the individual interests of those
from whomn goods are so obtained, were served by the statute and thwarted
by the decision.
10241 U. S. 591, 598 (1916).
"1259 U. S. 557 (1922).
"41 STAT. 305, Title 2, § 35.
"'Inra note 257.
"95 U. S. 670 (1878).
"REv. STAT. (1875) § 5132-(9).
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Another statute9 5 punished by fine and imprisonment the fraudulent use,
sale, and counterfeiting of trade-marks, registered in pursuance of another
United States statute9 5' the operation of which was not confined to inter-
state commerce. In prosecutions under the criminal statute, the court held
both unconstitutional because they were not within the commerce power
or any other other federal power.96 The decision protected those who use
pirated trade-marks in connection with businesses which they operate, to
the prejudice of the buying public who are deceived and the true owners of
the trade-marks who are fraudulently deprived of sales. In 1881, Congress
passed an act which was expressly limited to trade-marks used "in com-
merce with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes". 7 Interstate commerce
was included in 1905. 97-
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co.,"8 the Supreme Court, Justice Har-
lan dissenting, held that a combination of 98 per cent of the sugar refining
industry of the country could not be attacked under the Sherman Anti-Trust
Law, on the ground that the combination was in manufacture and did not
sufficiently affect interstate commerce to be within the power of Congress and
so within the act. A bill in equity to dissolve the combination was held
demurrable. Although the case was not strictly a criminal one, its doctrine
necessarily served to protect the same and similar combinations against the
criminal as well as the civil penalties of the act. The decision is not com-
monly counted among those which overruled acts of Congress; but Professor
Corwin is fully justified in saying that it "did to all intents and purposes
nullify the Sherman Act, and kept it nullified during the most critical period
in our industrial history, when most of the great trusts were formed, and it
did this in consequence of the Court's constitutional theories."9 9  There
was no serious suggestion that Congress was not interested in reaching the
Sugar Trust. William Howard Taft declared that "The effect of the decision
in the Knight case upon the popular mind, and indeed upon Congress as
well, was to discourage hope that the statute could be used to accomplish
its manifest purpose and curb the great industrial trusts . . .So strong was
the impression made by the Knight case that both Mr. Oney and Mr. Cleve-
land concluded that the evil must be controlled through State legislation,
and not through a national statute, and they said so in their communications
to Congress."'100 The decision "inhibited practically all prosecutions of in-
'19 STAT. 141.
116 STAT. 210.
'Trade Mark Cases, 100 U. S. 82 (1879).
121 STAT. 502.
1133 STAT. 724.
"156 U. S. 1 (1895).
"(1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 171.
ITAF-r, THE ANTI-TRuST AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) p. 60.
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dustrial combinations during nearly all the remainder of. the first decade
.after the statute. Indeed, Attorney General Harmon, in his annual report
to the President in 1896, stated that in view of the Knight decision it was
practically impossible to enforce the Sherman Act against industrials . .,,01
As was said some years ago, although "the case has never been overruled
- . . subsequent cases beginning with Addyston Pipe and Steel Company v.
United States'0 2 . . . have gone very far to restrict its authority."' 0 3  But
there can be little doubt that the immunity which the case conferred con-
tributed, during many years, to the development of the economic and poli-
tical power of the great trusts.
In an effort to control profiteering during and after the World War,
Congress passed the Lever Food Control Act which forbade, among other
things, unjust or unreasonable rates or charges in handling or dealing in any
necessaries. 0 5 The defendant in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co.'0 (
demurred to an indictment which accused it of making an unreasonable
charge of $19.50 for 100 pounds of sugar. The Supreme Court sustained
its demurrer, on the ground that the statute failed to fix an ascertainable
'standard of guilt and did not sufficiently inform accused persons of the
nature and cause of the accusation. The decision protected profiteering in
necessaries, to the disadvantage of the consumer. It was immediately fol-
lowed by decisions in which the court enjoined the prosecution of clothing,10 7
milk, 08 and sugar 09 dealers, quashed the indictment of a potato dealer,110
and reversed convictions for selling sugar at excessive prices,' and for con-
spiring to exact excessive prices for clothing." 2 In A. B. Small v. Amnerkan
Sugar Refining Co.," 3 the same section of the Lever Act was held unconsti-
tutional, on the same ground of indefiniteness, when offered as a defense to
a refiner's suit against a wholesaler for breach of contract to buy sugar.
V. CASES IN WHICH JUDICIAL SUPREMACY DEPRIVED NEGROES OF
PROTECTION
In a number of cases, congressional efforts to protect Negroes were de-
1
'McLAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS (1930) p. 23.
1-175 U. S. 211 (1899).
1
'BuwcIcK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1922) p. 218.
"Act of Aug. 10, 1917, § 4, 40 STAT. 277, amended by Act of Oct. 22, 1919, § 2, 41
STAT. 298.
101255 U. S. 81 (1921).
' Tedrow v. A. T. Lewis & Son Dry Goods Co., 255 U. S. 98 (1921) ; Kennington v.
Palmer, 255 U. S. 100 (1921); Weed & Co. v. Lockwood, 255 U. S. 104 (1921).1 Kinnane v. Detroit Creamery Co., 255 U. S. 102 (1921).11'G. S. Willard Co. v. Palmer, 255 U. S. 166 (1921).
"'United States v. Schwartz, 255 U. S. 102 (1921).
mOglesby Grocery Co., v. United States, 255 U. S. 108 (1921).
"'Weeds, Inc. v. United States, 255 U. S. 109 (1921).
"267 U. S. 233 (1925).
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feated by judicial supremacy. The sufferers from these decisions were a very
large class of poor persons. The first in this series of cases1 14 defended
property in slaves, and had consequences which were not limited to the rela-
tions between the races."
Dred Scott had been taken by his master from slave Missouri to free
Illinois, and then to Fort Snelling, in territory in which Congress by the
Missouri Compromise had prohibited slavery. He was afterward taken
back to Missouri, and sued there in a federal court to assert his freedom.
The Supreme Court's decision adverse to him was supported on various
grounds in the opinions of the justices who made up the majority, and it is
tenable that the point actually decided was not the unconstitutionality of
the Missouri Compromise but merely that "A slave taken by his master into
a State or Territory where slavery is prohibited by law, and afterwards
returning with his master into a slave State, and acquiring a residence there,
if deemed by the highest court of that State, after his return, to be a slave,
must be deemed a slave by the courts of the United States, and therefore not
entitled to sue in one of those courts as a citizen of that state." 1 5 But the
case contains numerous declarations, not felt as dicta by the judges who made
them, that the congressional prohibition of slavery in a territory was uncon-
stitutional, and it is commonly regarded as so holding." 6
Dred Scott himself was set free, in Missouri, within three months after
the Supreme Court had decided that he was a slave." 7 How many other
Negroes were adversely affected by the decision, in any direct way, is a mat-
ter of conjecture; probably not many. "Before the case was docketed . . .
Congress had passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act, on May 30, 1854, repealing
the Missouri Compromise Act . . . But by the time when it was reached
for its second argument, in December, 1856, the immense effect which a
court decision upon the power of Congress might have, in connection with
future legislation as to slavery in the Territories, was throughly realized."" 8a
It has become familiar that the constitutional doctrine which the Court
laid down had great consequences. To quote from James Bryce: "This
judgment, since the language used in it seemed to cut off the hope of a set-
tlement by the authority of Congress of the then (1857) pending disputes
n'Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
"'JOHN LOWELL AND HORACE GRAY (later Judge Lowell of the United States Circuit
Court for Massachusetts and Mr. Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court),
A LEGAL REvIEw OF THE CASE OF DRED SCOTT (1857) ; quoted in THAYER, CASES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1895) p. 496.
"'E.g., BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AmERic.ir CONSTITUTION, p. 300; WARRN, CON-
GRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPEmE COURT, p. 216; WILLOUGHBY, CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) p. 434.
'3 WARREN, SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY, 24, n.
nId. at 3, 7.
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over slavery and its extension, did much to precipitate the Civil War."11 9
Opinions to like effect might be multiplied. The Republican platform on
which Lincoln was elected in 1860 declared that "the new dogma that the
Constitution of its own force carries slavery into any or all territories of
the United States is a dangerous political heresy, at variance with the explicit
provisions of the instrument itself, with contemporaneous exposition, and
with legislative and judicial precedent; is revolutionary in its tendency, and
subversive of the peace and harmony of the country."'120 Warren concedes
that "The attitude of the Court on questions arising out of the slavery issue
was closely connected with the outbreak of the Civil War.'' His treatment of
the subject illustrates the optimism of some advocates of judicial review.
The Dred Scott case, he tells us, is among those which "can be easily passed
over" in considering the "effect on our country" of judicial review, since "it
was cured by the result of the Civil War.' u22
The first two sections of a statute of May 31, 1870,123 required that all
-citizens entitled to do so be allowed to qualify and to vote, "without distinc-
tiofn of race, color, or previous condition of servitude," and made interference
with qualifying a misdemeanor. The third and fourth sections made it a
misdemeanor to refuse to receive the vote of "any citizen" who had been
wrongly prevented from qualifying, or to prevent "any citizen" from qualify-
ing or from voting. Inspectors of election in Kentucky were indicted,
under the third and fourth sections, for refusing to receive, in a municipal
election, the vote of a citizen of the United States of African descent. In
United States v. Reese,124 a divided court held that, although the defendant's
refusal was on account of race, the indictment was invalid because sections
three and four of the statute were not limited to refusals on account of race,
but were general, and therefore exceeded the authority given to Congress by
the Fifteenth Amendment. Whether Congress intended to legislate in favor of
Negroes only, or, as the Court thought, in favor of persons generally, it is
obvious that Congress sought to protect large numbers of poor and un-
influential persons in their right to vote; that the complaining witness was
among the persons intended to be protected; and that the Court's decision
denied him and his kind the intended protection. The legislation sought to
1 BRYCE, AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH (1st ed.) 257, quoted by Thayer, op. cit. supra
note 115, p. 496.
a'STANWOOD, HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENCY (1898) p. 293; quoted by HAINES, AMER-
IcAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (2d ed. 1932) 374.
' 1 SUPREME COmRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 4.
mWARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT, p. 135. Even
on the question of citizenship, the doctrine of the Dred Scott case did not stand. "The
Fourteenth Amendment 'recalled' The Dred Scott decision on this point and definitely
defined United States citizenship in terms of birth in the country and subject to its
jurisdiction." CUSHMAN, LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DEcISIONS (3d ed. 1932) p. 48.
'16 STAT. 140.
'-"92 U. S. 214 (1876).
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enforce rights to vote which, in theory, existed already by virtue of the Fif-
teenth Amendment. So far the statute served, and the decision contravened,
the social interest in order. Although there were some educated Negroes
among those whose disfranchisement the court protected, and many ignorant
whites among those who were not disfranchised, the decision undoubtedly
tended to raise the average literacy, as well as the average prosperity, of the
electorate. It also tended to preserve literacy and prosperity as monopolies
in the hands of the white people of the south, who were measurably pro-
tected in the exclusive privilege of electing the men who make the laws
which regulate the distribution of education and wealth. It tended to make
Negroes less prosperous and less free.
' A later case protected, against another clause of the same statute, a dif-
ferent sort of interference with Negro suffrage. The statute 25, sought to
punish bribery and intimidation, in any election, of voters whose right to
vote is guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment. In James v. Bozunnan12 6 the
defendants were indicted for bribing colored men not to vote in a congres-
sional election in Kentucky. They were released by a divided Supreme Court
on habeas corpus, on the ground that the legislation was not authorized by the
Fifteenth Amendment, because that amendment applies only to action by a
state or by the United States, and because no discrimination on account of
race was charged; nor by the congressional power over federal elections,
because the statute undertook to deal with all elections.
The statute involved in United States z. Harris1'7 sought to punish any
two or more persons who should "conspire... for the purpose of depriving
... any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws ...
or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of
any State or Territory from giving . . . to all persons . . . equal protection
of laws.' 1 28 Twenty men were indicted for conspiring with others to deprive
four individuals of the equal protection of the laws, and for beating all and
killing one of the four, while they were in the custody of a state officer
on criminal charges in Crockett County, Tennessee. The Court held the stat-
ute unconstitutional as not within the Fourteenth Amendment, since no state
action was involved, nor the Thirteenth, since the statute was not confined to
the protection of former slaves. The opinion does not state the color of the
mob or its victims, but it contains implications in accordance with the prob-
ability that the mob was white and the victims Negroes. However that may
be, the Court is clearly right in drawing an analogy with United States v.
Reese.129 Here, as there, Congress had sought to protect unprivileged and
116 STAT. 141, REv. STAT. § 5507.
=190 U. S. 127 (1903).
"u'106 U. S. 629 (1883).
'17 STAT. 13, REv. STAT. § 5519.
'Supra note 124.
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relatively helpless persons, chiefly Negroes, against abuses which were
plainly illegal, but against which state laws and state courts gave inadequate
protection. Here, as there, the decision denied the protection which Con-
gress had tried to give. The doctrine of United States v. Harris was re-
affirmed in Baldwin v. Franks. °30 Baldwin was arrested, under the same
statute, on a charge of conspiring with others to deprive certain Chinese
aliens of the equal protection of the laws, by kidnapping them and driving
them from their homes. In habeas corpus proceedings, the Court again held
the statute unconstitutional.
Again in Hodges v. United States' judicial supremacy denied to Negroes
the protection against mob violence which Congress had attempted to give
them. Statutes' 3 2 undertook to give to all persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States the same rights to make contracts and to the equal pro-
tection of the laws, as white citizens, and forbade the intimidation of any
citizens in the free exercise of rights and privileges secured by the consti-
tution or laws of the United States. The defendants were convicted of in-
timidating colored citizens in Arkansas, because of their color, into abandon-
ing work. The Supreme Court, two justices dissenting, reversed the con-
viction. It held that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments did not jus-
tify it, since their restrictions relate only to state action, which was not
involved in the case; nor the Thirteenth, since the case did not involve
slavery or involuntary servitude.
In cases of a third type, involving neither voting nor violence, judicial
supremacy resulted in the denial to Negroes of "civil rights" which Congress
had sought to give them. The "Civil Rights Act" of 187518n provided
that "all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be en-
titled to the full and equal enjoyment" of inns, public conveyances, and
places of public amusement; "subject only to conditions and limitations ...
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude." A money penalty was imposed, to be recovered
by the person aggrieved, and violation of the statute was made a misde-
meanor. The Civil Rights Cases134 involved an indictment for denying hotel
accommodations to colored persons; an information for refusing a colored
person a seat in a theatre; an indictment for denying to a person, whose col-
or was not stated, the full enjoyment of theatre accommodations; and an
action to recover the statutory penalty for refusal, because of color, to admit
a woman to a "ladies' car" on a railroad train. The Court, Justice Harlan
dissenting, held the statute unconstitutional, as not covered by the Fourteenth
'13120 U. S. 678 (1887).
'203 U. S. 1 (1906).
'=REv. STAT. §§ 1977, 5508
"'18 STAT. 336.
21109 U. S. 3 (1883).
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Amendment because no state action was in issue, nor by the Thirteenth because
no servitude was inflicted. Interests both of personality and substance were
involved. Not only are the discriminations in question humiliating, not only
is one deprived of immediate enjoyment if he is not allowed to travel or
go to a hotel on the same terms as another; but whatever makes it difficult or
uncomfortable for one to travel injures him economically, by interfering
with his development of economic capacity and his access to economic oppor-
tunity. The interest which the decision protected was that of a dominant
race in excluding a depressed race from opportunity and comfort.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 made another appearance before the Su-
preme Court in 1913, in Butts v. Merchants Transportation Co.' 35 A col-
ored woman sued for discriminations to which she had been subjected on
shipboard between Boston and Norfolk. The Court took the position that as
the statute had already been held invalid within a state, and had not been
intended to apply specifically outside the states, it was impossible to separate
a constitutional part from the unconstitutional part, and the whole act was
invalid.
It is often assumed that the Supreme Court protects "civil rights" or
"civil liberties" against congressional attack. Here is a considerable group
of cases in which Congress provided protection, and the Court withdrew it.
If the suffrage, violence, and civil rights cases had all been decided the
other way, many Negroes would still have been disfranchised, excluded from
hotels, and lynched. In large areas prosecutors, judges, and juries would
have given the statutes no substantial enforcement even if the Supreme
Court had declared them constitutional. But it seems clear that in border-
line situations or communities, at least, the actual treatment of Negroes
would have been affected if the federal statutes had been upheld.136
VI. CASES IN WHICH JUDICIAL SUPREMSACY PROTECTED BUSINESS INTER-
ESTS IN CONFLICT WITH LABOR INTERESTS
In a striking series of cases decided between 1908 and 1923, the Supreme
Court nullified a variety of efforts on the part of Congress to benefit the
working class. These decisions dealt, in a manner uniformly adverse to the
interests of labor and favorable to the actual or apparent interests of busi-
-230 U. S. 126.
'-According to the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (Vol. XI, p. 339; 1933) the
Civil Rights Cases "resulted in the passage by practically every southern state of Jim
Crow laws," and were followed by increases in lynching and in the denial of suffrage to
Negroes.
According to Brooks Adams, "The Civil Rights Act of 1875 grew rapidly un-
popular, and the decision which overturned it coincided with a strong drift of opinion.
The Civil Rights Cases were decided in October, 1883, and Mr. Cleveland was elected
President in 1884. Doubtless the law would have been repealed had the judiciary sup-
ported it." TE THEORY OF SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS (1913) p. 75, n.
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ness, with unionization, employer's liability, workmen's compensation, child
labor, and a minimum wage for women.
An act of 1898137 made it a misdemeanor for an interstate carrier to
threaten" an employee with loss of employment, or to discriminate unjustly
against an employee, because of membership in any labor organization. In
Adair v. United States3 8 the defendant was indicted and convicted for dis-
charging ia locomotive fireman because he belonged to a union. The Supreme
court reversed the conviction, chiefly on the ground that the statute deprived
the defendant of liberty and property without due process of law. Obvious-
ly the decision deprived railroad labor of an aid to unionization which Con-
gress had sought to give it, and thereby served the economic interests of
ownership and management at the expense of those of labor. Theoreti-
cally, railroad rates are so regulated that the cost of any improvements in
hours, wages, and conditions that unions obtain is passed along to the
public in the form of higher rates; but it is, of course, frequently impossible
in practice to force the public to absorb an increase in costs, either because
the carrier cannot show that the margin between the new costs and the old
rates is less than a fair return, or because the traffic will not bear an increase
in rates. Moreover, though the statute before the" court in the Adair case
related only to interstate carriers, the doctrine of the case is not confined
to carriers or to interstate commerce. Edwin E. Witte thus summarized
the law in 1932: "The right of employers to discriminate against union men is
undoubted. Twenty-two states at one time had laws which made it a criminal
offense for employers to discharge or refuse to employ a workman for mem-
bership in any labor union, and the federal government included a similar
provision applicable to the railroads of the country in the Erdman Act of
1898. Some of these laws are still to be found in the statute books, but all
of them have been rendered valueless by decisions of the Supreme Courts
of the United States and nearly a dozen states holding such legislation to be
unconstitutional."'' 9
As the statute had never been observed, its annulment apparently made
little change in the practical situation.139 ' It does not follow that the adverse
decision was unimportant; a favorable decision would probably have been fol-
lowed by some degree of enforcement. Among outgrowths of the case were
Coppage v. Kansas,1 40 which held unconstitutional a state statute imposing
criminal penalties on the exaction of a yellow dog contract, and Hitchman Coal
Co. v. Mitchell,14 1 which upheld the contract by an injunction against attempts
='30 STAT. 424, 428.
"'208 U. S. 161 (1908).
'WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932) p. 212.
"PERLMAN, HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES (1922) p. 202;
SEIDMAN, THE YELuow DOG CONTRACT (1932) p. 24.1'236 U. S. 1 (1915).
141245 U. S. 229 (1917).
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of third persons to unionize the plant. Laws like the one involved in the Cop,
page case had been on the books in some fourteen states, but had been likewise,
so generally ignored that labor was not dismayed at their annulment.1412 Con-
cern has been expressed lest the Court carry the doctrines of these cases to the
point of outlawing the Norris-LaGuardia Act 1 42 and recent state legislation
which, without making yellow dog contracts criminal, undertake to make them
wholly or partly unenforceable.143  "New Deal" legislation is outside the scope
of this article.
In 1906 Congress passed an act which undertook to eliminate the fellow-ser-
vant doctrine, and in large degree the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of risk, in actions brought by injured employees or their
representatives against any "common carrier engaged in trade or commerce"
among the states. 44 Suits were brought against railroads by the representa-
tives of two firemen who had been killed in operating interstate trains. The
majority of the Supreme Court held, in the Employers Liability Cases, 45 that
the act was unconstitutional because not confined to the interstate activities
of the interstate carriers. The case was decided on January. 6, 1908. On
April 22, 1908, Congress passed a second liability act the burden of which was
limited to railroads "while engaging" in interstate commerce, and the bene-
fit of which was limited to employees "suffering injury while . . . employed
... in such commerce."'146 This act was upheld by the Court in the Second
Employers Liability Cases.147 The earlier case, accordingly, did not long
wholly deprive of protection employees who were themselves "employed in"
the interstate commerce of the carriers. For this reason, it has been said
that the first decision "was cured by Congress itself by passing a properly
worded new law."' 14 8 This overlooks the fact that other employees of inter-
state carriers remained without the protection which the earlier act had ap-
parently' 49 sought to give them, and the more serious fact that it became
""Seidman, supra note 139a.
12247 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1935) §§ 101-115.
2"Cf. FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930) pp. 212-214;
Osmond K. Fraenkel, Recent Statutes Affecting Labor Injunctions and Yellow-Dog
Contracts (1936) 30 ILL. L. REv. 854. "There are many who believe that by Texas &
N. 0. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. and S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 (1930) both the
Adair and the Coppage cases were overruled. It is clear, however, that the Court at
the time did not intend to overrule them. For Chief Justice Hughes expressly pointed
out that the law then under consideration was not aimed at the employer's right to select
or discharge his employees, 'but at the interference with the right of employees to have
representatives of their own choosing.' Nevertheless, the judgment which was affirmed
in that case punished the carrier for contempt by reason of its refusal to reinstate em-
ployees discharged on account of their union membership." Fraenkel, supra, pp. 862,
863.1"34 STAT. 232.
21&207 U. S. 463 (1908).
"'§ 51, 35 STAT. 65.
147223 U. S. 1 (1912).
"'WARREN, CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREMAE COURT, p. 135.149Four members of the Court, dissenting, in the First Employer's Liability Cases, 207
U. S. 463, held that the act should be interpreted as limited to interstate activities.
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necessary to decide, in an unending series of cases, a logically unanswer-
able question: When is an employee of a railroad "employed in" interstate
commerce, so as to be governed by the act, and when is he not so employed,
so that he must rely on state laws? A fireman who has prepared his engine
for an interstate trip, and is crossing a track to his home shortly before
starting the trip, is employed in interstate commerce 150 so is an employee
engaged in the duty of noting the numbers on interstate cars in a freight
train standing in the yards ;151 but an employee hoisting coal into a chute from
which it is to be taken "by, and for the use of, locomotive engines principally
employed in the movement of interstate freight" is not employed in inter-
state commerce.1 52  In reaching that conclusion, the Court expressly over-
ruled cases in which it had held that a man providing water,153 or sand, 5 4
for the use of locomotives engaged in both interstate and intrastate commerce
was engaged in interstate commerce. In an exhaustive study of Workmen's
Compensation on Interstate Railways,'5 5 published in 1934, Messrs. Schoene
and Watson found that the Supreme Court itself had devoted 43 opinions
to an effort to determine what constitutes interstate employment, 56 and that
the number of cases involving the distinction, during the second eight years
of the operation of the Act, was more than double the number for the first
eight years. "When it is borne in mind that each case involved an activity
whose status was uncertain after nearly two decades of litigation, the futility
of attempting to achieve predictability along these lines becomes manifest...
Infinite harm must arise out of this legal bisection of the transportation
industry." 57 "In terms of actual results, it would seem that any additional
chance of recovery which the Act purported to give the workman in 1908
has been much more than offset by the amount it costs him to determine in
court whether he comes within its terms.'15 8  "The switchman, the hostler,
the mechanic, the conductor, the engineer, and the brakeman as well as the
flagman, the coal heaver, and the camp cook ..... receive as compensation
for injuries, not cash with which to pay the doctor and the grocer, but an
opportunity to wager on the outcome of a legal tournament."' 59  If the
earlier and broader statute had been upheld, these difficulties would have bean
almost wholly obviated.
judicial supremacy has produced a like confusion in the situation of mari-
'14North Carolina R. R. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248 (1914).
'Pecos & Northern Ry. v. Rosenbloom, 240 U. S. 439 (1916).
'Chicago & E. I. R. R. v. Industrial Comm. of Illinois, 284 U. S. 296, 297 (1932).
"Erie R. R. v. Collins, 253 U. S. 77 (1920).
'Erie R. R. v. Szary, 253 U. S. 86 (1920).
go(1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 389.
OId. at 398.
mId. at 407.1
"Id. at 408.
ulId. at 398. The authors conclude, after examining state legislation, that the federal
law should be repealed (p. 424).
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time workers with respect to compensation. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen'6P
involved the death of a longshoreman who was killed at work unloading a
ship in New York Harbor. The New York State Workmen's Compensation
Act was, by its terms, applicable, but because of the maritime character of the
injury the Supreme Court held that an award under the state act was invalid.
Congress subsequently made two efforts to confer upon maritime workers,
or some of them, the benefit of State compensation acts. Both these efforts
were blocked, on constitutional grounds, by the Supreme Court. Shortly
after the Jensen decision, the statute relating to cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction was amended so as to save claimants "the rights and reme-
dies under the workmen's compensation law of any state."'161 A bargeman
doing work of a maritime nature fell into the Hudson and was drowned. In
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart'62 the Court, by a vote of five to four, up-
set an award of compensation under the state act to the man's widow. The,
majority took the position that the federal act was invalid because of the
provision of Article III, Section 3, of the Constitution that "The judicial
power shall extend ... to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction."
Congress, the court held, was attempting to delegate its legislative power to
the states, and was also destroying the uniformity in maritime matters
which the Constitution contemplated. Congress later amended the statute
by expressly excepting masters and members of crews from the provision
saving to claimants their rights under state compensation acts.163 In
State of Washington v. Dawson and Co., and Industrial Accident Commis-
sion v. James Rolph Co.,'64 two cases heard together, the Court decided,
Justice Brandeis dissenting, that the exception did not save the statute. It
accordingly held that a stevedoring corporation whose men worked on
ships in Puget Sound could not be compelled to contribute to the Washing-
ton compensation fund, and that the representatives of a man killed at mari-
time work on a vessel in San Francisco could not recover under the Cali-
fornia act.
In Western Fuel Co. v. GarciaY5 the Court had treated a state death act
as applicable to the negligent killing of a stevedore at work on a vessel in San
Francisco. The subject, the Court said, was "maritime and local in char-
acter." Later decisions have permitted the application even of state compen-
sation acts to injuries on admiralty waters, provided the victim's work is
"local" and has no "direct relation to navigation or commerce". The inevit-
able cloudiness of such a distinction is evinced by the decisions which apply
it. The Court has held local compensation acts applicable in the case of a
2c4244 U. S. 205 (1917).1O140 STAT. 395 (Oct. 6, 1917).
1=253 U. S. 149 (1920).
1242 STAT. 634 (June 10, 1922).
"1264 U. S. 219 (1924).11-257 U. S. 233 (1921).
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diver suffocated while removing an obstruction to navigation,166 and of
workers who put together, towed, and took apart log booms in navigable
waters.167 The Court has held local compensation acts not applicable in the
cases of a painter working on a ship lying at Philadelphia 6 8 and a boiler-
maker injured while repairing a ship's smoke-stack. 69 Since 1927, a federal
compensation act has been in force for such maritime workers as fall into the
class of "longshoremen and harbor workers"; but, 'as this act 1 70 applies only
when recovery "through workmen's compensation proceedings may not
validly-be provided by state law,"'' it does not end the puzzling question
what work is so "local," within the judicial concept, that state -compensation
acts may apply and the federal act does not. Seamen are still left to their
1920 Act,'72 which is not a compensation act. Thus, the fensen case and the
Knickerbocker case have led to prolonged confusion, and have frequently
prevented compensation for the injuries of poor men.'7
3
The two cases in which the Court prevented Congress from restricting
child labor are familiar. Both statutes were aimed at the employment of
children under 16 (a) in mines and quarries, or (b) over eight hours a day
or six days a week, or at night, in factories; and the employment of children
under 14 in factories. The first statute '74 prohibited interstate shipment of
the products of concerns which employed child labor. By a vote of five to
four, the Court held this unconstitutional in Hammer v. Dagenhart,175 on the
ground that it interfered with domestic concerns of the states. Congress
then passed an act which laid a tax of ten per cent on the net profits of
concerns which employed child labor.' 76 This tax was held invalid, over the
dissent of Justice Clarke, on the ground that "its prohibitory and regulatory
effect and purpose are palpable.' 7 7  Congress may exclude lottery tickets
'Millers Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U. S. 59 (1926).
'Sultan Ry. and Timber Co. v. Department of Labor, 277 U. S. 135 (1928).
"'John Baizley Iron Work v. Span, 281 U. S. 222 (1930).
"Messel v. The Foundation Co., 274 U. S. 427 (1927).
" Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers Act, 44 STAT. Pt. 2, 1424, 33 U. S. C. A. §§
901 ff.
1-33 U. S. C. A. § 903.
"741 STAT. 1007, 46 U. S. C. A. § 688. It adopts for seamen the provisions of the
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS LIABILITY AcT: G. H. Robinson, Seamen in Admiralty Law (1936)
16 B. U. L. REv. 283, 301.
"'For the foregoing bit of maritime history, I have drawn on an unpublished paper
by Professor G. H. Robinson of the Cornell Law School, who now writes the follow-
ing comment: "The Court was saying that if Congress passed legislation governing the
maritime field, Congress should so frame it that it would operate uniformly. When
Congress did pass such a statute in the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensation
Act the Court held it constitutional. 'The general authority of Congress,' it said,
'to alter or revise the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country is beyond
dispute.' Score a credit to the Court for insisting upon legislation thoroughgoing in
form and national in scope rather than the patchwork which Congress first offered."
17139 STAT. 675 (1916).
1247 U. S. 251 (1918).
1"40 STAT. 1138 (Feb. 24, 1919).
"1'Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20, 37 (1922).
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from interstate commerce, 178 although "the real purpose of the act was to
discourage a type of business or enterprise of which Congress disapproved,
but over which, within the States, it had no direct powers of regulation" ;179
and Congress may impose a prohibitive tax of ten cents per pound (100 per
cent, more or less, of the profit) on colored oleomargarine,' 80 with the ob-
vious purpose of preventing its sale; but Congress may deal in neither of
these ways with child labor. Few decisions have had more serious conse-
quences. "Available data indicate that the employment of children increased
markedly after this law was invalidated. ' '18°" The effects of child labor in
mechanical industries on children, on the wage level, and on society generally,
and the impossibility of dealing effectively with the matter by states, are only
too well known. Its chief burden falls, obviously, on the poor; it pays divi-
dends to some of the well-to-do. 181
In order "to protect the women and minors of the District from condi-
tions detrimental to their health and morals, resulting from wages which
are inadequate to maintain decent standards of living,"'1 2 Congress adopted
a minimum wage law for women and children in the District of Columbia.183
A board was authorized to hold hearings and to prohibit the payment of
wages found to be inadequate to maintain the health and morals of women
workers in given occupations. A special license might be issued for the
employment at sub-standard wages of a woman of impaired earning capacity.
The board had been functioning for some time, and reports of general good
results from the operation of the statute were before the Court when it en-
joined enforcement as unconstitutional. 184 The vote was five to three, and
Justice Brandeis took no part. "Freedom of contract," according to the
majority of the Court, "is the general rule and restraint the exception" ;'8r
and the Court found no justification for an exception. It can hardly be dis-
'Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
"WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, p. 977.
'McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
"°COMMONS AND ANDREWS, PRINcIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1936) p. 174; Cf.
ELIZABETH BRANDEIS, LABOR LEGISLATION (1935) p. 443.
'A constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to "limit, regulate, and prohibit the
labor of persons under eighteen years of age" was proposed by Congress in 1924; 43
STAT. 670. In 13 years, only 28 states out of the necessary 36 have ratified. New York
Times, Mar. 21, 1937.
Gainfully employed children between 10 and 15 years old, according to the Census,
numbered 1,060,858 in 1920 and 667,118 in 1930. Of these, 185,652 in 1920 and 68,266
in 1930 were reported engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries ; 7,191 in
1920 and 1,184 in 1930 as engaged in mining. U. S. CENsus REPORTS, FIFTEENTH CEN-
sus (1930), Vol. V. c. 6, Tables 1 and 5. The Census ignores employment before the
age of 10. The effect of the depression upon the volume of child labor is a matter
of much debate.
1§ 23, 40 STAT. 964.
"'40 STAT. 960 (September 19, 1918).
'Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
",261 U. S. at p. 546. "No such doctrine is stated in the Constitution . . . it comes
from Mr. Justice Sutherland" (who wrote the opinion). -Powell, The Judiciarlity of
Minimum Wage Legislation (1924) 37 HAv. L. REv. 545, 555.
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puted that starvation wages for women, when economically avoidable, are
bad for the immediate victims, for the general wage level, and for the com-
munity. Like child labor, the burden falls directly and chiefly upon.the poor-
est, while the profits of some enterprises are increased. As Professor Powell
pointed out, "the theoretical possibility of injurious effects" from a statutory
minimum wage "on the interests of the laboring class is not to be taken too
seriously in view of the line of cleavage between those who favor and those
who oppose minimum wage legislation. Its proponents are those who are not
callous toward the interest of the employees whom it affects and who are not
unfamiliar with the. experience under the minimum wage laws in opera-
tion."'186
The statute which the Court annulled was a local one, but the effect of the
decision was not local. It appeared to mean that all minimum wage laws, state
or federal, were unconstitutional. In 1923, when the case was decided, some
13 states had minimum wage laws. An equally divided court had sustained
the Oregon law in 1917 ;186 and that law and some others continued in effect,
in one degree or another, after the Adkins decision; but many of the state laws
were ignored or repealed. In 1925 and 1927, on the authority of the Adkins
case, the Supreme Court annulled the laws of Arizona and Arkansas.18s @
Eight or nine new state laws were passed between 1931 and 1936.18(" In
1936, by a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court annulled the New York
law of 1933.186' Finally, on March 29, 1937, again by a vote of five to four,
the Court upheld the Washington law of 1913, which "throughout this entire
period . . . has been in force", and expressly overruled Adkins v. Children's
Hospital. 86 "
VII. CASES IN WIIICH JUDICITAL SUPREMACY PROTECTED. BUSINESS FROM
TAXATION
In a considerable number of instances judicial supremacy has protected
a business against a tax. It seems a safe generalization that the owners of
the business are commonly the principal beneficiaries of such decisions, al-
though in some instances, no doubt, the benefit extends to employees.
m(1924) 37 HARV. L. REv. at 568. "Among the better-established results of minimum
wage legislation ... may be mentioned (1) that it has raised wages; (2) that minimum
wage rates do not in general tend to become maximum rates; (3) that it does not neces-
sarily force workers out of industry; (4) that it does not unduly handicap employers; (5)
that it does not undermine trade union organization; and (6) that it does not decrease
efficiency." Commons and Andrews, Principles of Labor Legislation (1927) p. 224, (1936)
p. 74. Cf. ELIzABETH BRANDEIS, LABOR LEGISLATION (1935) p. 534.
"Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629 (1917).
"-Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U. S. 530 (1925); Donham v. West-Nelson Mfg. Co., 273
U. S. 657 (1927).1"0(1936) 26 Am. LAB. LEG. REV. 84; (1936) 42 MONTHLY LABOR REv. 658.
"'Morehead v. N. Y. ex rel Tipaldo, 298 U. S. 587 (1936).
"'West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish; N. Y. Times, March 30, 1937, p. 14.
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A number of cases were decided on the ground that the tax burdened
states or their agencies, cities. The Court has argued that "If they may be
taxed lightly, they may be taxed heavily; if justly, oppressively. Their oper-
ation may be impeded and may be destroyed, if any interference is permit-
ted."' 87  Mr. Justice Holmes has countered, "The power to tax is not the
power to destroy while this court sits."' 88 Immunity is not merely unneces-
sary, it is also not far from useless to the states. Its apparent advantage'to them
is usually absorbed, in fact, by private persons, and moreover is offset by the
reciprocal immunity of the federal government from state taxation. As
Mr. Justice Stone has said, "the practical effect of enlargement" of the
immunity "is commonly to relieve individuals from a tax, at the expense of
the government imposing it, without substantial benefit to the government
for whose theoretical advantage the immunity is invoked ... It is significant
that neither the federal nor any state government has appeared by interven-
tion or otherwise to support this claim of immunity in cases in which
the taxpayer has urged it upon us.' 8 9  .
A statute laid a tax of 5 per cent upoh interest payable by railroads and
certain similar companies, and authorized the companies to deduct the
amount of the tax from the interest. In United States v. Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad Co., 90 the Court, two justices dissenting, held that the United
States could not collect from the company the tax on those of its bonds
which were held by the city of Baltimore, as such tax was in effect one
upon the city. The immediate effect of the decision was to protect the economic
interests of cities which had already bought railroad bonds, in the receipt
of the promised return without deduction, to the detriment of the interest
of the federal government in collecting the tax. But the dedision necessarily
had the further effect of increasing the attractiveness of railroad bonds to
state agencies, in whose hands they became, by the decision, tax-free. As
buyers will pay more for a tax-free bond than for one which is subject to
taxation, some of the benefit of the decision probably found its way to the
railroad companies and their stockholders.' 9 '
In Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States,192 the Motocycle Company was
allowed to recover a 5 per cent tax it had paid on a cycle which it had sold
to the city of Westfield, Massachusetts, for use in its police department. The
tax was levied on articles "sold or leased by the manufacturer, producer, or
'United States v. Baltimore and Ohio R. R., 17 Wall. 322, 327 (U. S. 1873).
''Dissent in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U. S. 218 (1928).
"Dissent in Indian Motocycle Co. v. United States, 283 U. S. 570, 582 (1931).
"117 Wall. 322 (U. S. 1873).
'It is safe to say that no benefit reached the public in the form of a reduction in
railroad rates, since the amount involved was small, railroad rates were practically
unregulated at the time, and the courts have even yet refused to treat the amount of the
capital charge as the measure of a reasonable return.
m283 U. S. 570 (1931).
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importer.' 19 3 With Justices Stone and Brandeis dissenting, the court held
that this was a sales tax and unconstitutional as a burden on Massachusetts
in the exercise of a governmental function. A tax which is payable on
many or most sales is commonly included in the regular price of the product.
There is no reason to assume that the seller of motorcycles allowed cities a
deduction from its regular price when sales to cities became tax-free. The
opposition of manufacturers and dealers to sales taxes is not irrational.
There is always a chance that they may not be able to pass on the entire
burden; and the tax, even if passed on, reduces the volume of sales. The
fact that, in the Motocycle case itself, the manufacturer fought the case
through the courts is ground for thinking that the decision he won protected
him from future burdens. The future burden, if any, from which it protect-
ed cities, was not only uncertain and contingent but small. 194
Congress granted certain lands to Oklahoma for the benefit of schools.
The Oklahoma legislature leased some of these lands, and directed payment
of the proceeds into the school fund. The Coronado Company, a lessee, paid
to the state, as rent, specified percentages of the gross production of oil and
gas. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co.195 the question was whether
the company was liable for income and excess-profits taxes upon its net
income from the leased lands. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court
-decided that it was not liable, on the ground that "the lease to the respondent
.was an instrumentality of the State for the purpose of carrying out her duty
in respect of public schools. To tax the income of the lessee arising there-
from would amount to an imposition upon the lease itself."'196 The only
direct and certain effect of the decision was to protect the holders of leases
-from federal taxation. Lessees were not called upon to share with the state
the money which the Court permitted them to retain or recover. In respect
to subsequent leases, some fraction of the money which the decision saved
-to lessees 'might find its way to the state treasury in the form of higher
, rental. But it is most unlikely that the state would be able to fix the rents,
in future leases, so high as to absorb the entire saving; and since the holders
-of existing leases necessarily retain the entire saving, it is evident
that, as between business interests and the general public, a clear net advan-
t ge from the decision remains on the side of business.197
"MEvENUE AcT OF 1924, 43 STAT. 253, 322, § 600.
'If that burden were great enough to call for the tax immunity which the court
granted, the burden imposed upon a state by federal taxation of its liquor business would
more clearly call for immunity; yet the Court has continued to permit the application
of the liquor tax to states, on the ground that no governmental function is involved.
Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1934).
11285 U. S. 393 (1932).
'"Id. at 400, 401.
'"The year after the Coronada case, Burnet v. A. T. Jergins Trust, 288 U. S. 508
(1933), "upheld a federal income tax on a lessee of city oil lands as to income from the
sale of oil there produced. The Gillespie and Coronado cases were distinguished on the
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The Revenue Act of 1921198 laid a tax upon life insurance companies based
on their gross income from interest, dividends, and rents, less certain deduc-
tions. In effect a deduction was allowed of (1) interest on tax-exempt
securities together with (2) enough more so that the sum of (1) and (2)
should equal 4 per cent of the company's mean insurance reserve. This
amounted, as Justice Brandeis pointed out in his dissent in Nqtional Life
Insurance Co. v. United States,9 9 to a provision for deducting from gross
income either the interest from tax-exempt bonds or an amount equal to
4 per cent of the reserve, whichever sum was the greater. It bad seemed to
Congress, and it seemed to Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, that the
two deductions need not be cumulated; that immunity of state and municipal
bonds from taxation was fully protected by making the deduction never less
than the amount of the income from such bonds. Evidently the legislation
did not injure life insurance companies in general, as most of them bad
approved it when it was under consideration in Congress, 20 0 and in the
National Life case itself, the Metropolitan Life, the Mutual Benefit Life,
and the Prudential, as amid curiae, filed a brief through Mr. Charles Evans
Hughes in support of the legislation. But the Court decided that the legis-
lation was unconstitutional, as in effect imposing a tax on state bonds, and
that the complaining company was entitled to deduct from its gross income
the sum of its tax-exempt interest and 4 per cent of its reserve. The practi-
cal effect of the decision would seem to consist in increasing slightly the de-
mand for, and the value of, tax-exempt securities, and in shifting a certain
amount of tax burden from insurance companies to other taxpayers. As
the majority of the population hold neither tax-exempt securities nor in-
surance company stock, and carry either little life insurance or none at all,
they derived no substantial benefit from the decision. Its beneficiaries were
the stockholders and perhaps in the long run the policyholders of certain
life insurance companies, together with the issuers and owners of tax-exempt
securities.
Four cases of small importance protected export trade against trifling
ground that there the sovereign was acting as trustee of an express trust of the lands
leased, a distinction without economic basis.... Apparently, immunity of lessees of gov-
ernment land is now to be the isolated exception, confined to facts so similar to those
disclosed in the Gillespie and Coronado cases that judicial ingenuity cannot devise a
verbal distinction." Developments in the Law: Taxation (1934) 47 HAnv. L. REv.
1209, 1213. Cf. Constitutional Law: Taxation: Exemption of Governmental Instrumen-
talities (1932) 18 CORNELL L. Q. 77; Taxation-Constitutional Law-Test for Validity
of Taxes on Governmental Instrumentalities (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 1075.
"In its application of the rule ...that the instrumentality of one sovereign must be
immune from taxation by the other, the Supreme Court has varied between a doctrinal
approach which tends to condemn the tax falling in any degree upon a government
instrumentality, and an economic analysis which may condone the tax whose burden
upon the function is slight." 47 HAv. L. REv. 1209.
11§9 243-245, 42 STAT. 227, 261.
'"277 U. S. 508, 524 (1928).
2277 U. S. at 523.
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burdens which the Court thought violated Section 9 of Article I of the Consti-
tution: "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state."
In Fairbank v. United States,20 by a vote of five to four, this provision
was held to invalidate a tax on export bills of lading, and a conviction and
fine for issuing an export bill without the prescribed revenue stamp were
reversed. As the tax was ten cents, regardless of the value of the export,
it is obvious that few consignments could have been prevented or made un:
profitable by its enforcement. In United States v. Hvaslef , 20 2 a tax of $3
to $10, according to the tonnage of the vessel, upon charter parties and simi-
lar documents, was held invalid with respect to the carriage of cargoes from
American to foreign ports, and the taxpayer was allowed to recover back the
amount he had paid. A War Revenue Act of 1917203 taxed at two or three
per cent various articles "sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer."
In Spalding and Brother v. Edwards,20 4 it was held unconstitutional to col-
lect a 3 per cent tax on baseball bats which the manufacturer delivered to
a carrier in New York, marked with the name of a customer in Venezuela.
The sale was a "step in exportation."205 In Thames and Mersey Insurance
Company v. United States,20 6 the Court annulled a tax of one-half of 1 pet
cent on insurance policies covering exports, and allowed the insurance com-
pany which had paid the tax to recover it. Evidently all these taxes were
too small to have any substantial effect on the volume of the export trade.
The decisions made that trade slightly more profitable to those who held
stock in the companies concerned.
207
'41181 U. S. 283 (1901).
'2237 U. S. 1 (1915).
1§ 600, 40 STAT. 300, 316.
20262 U. S. 66 (1923).
"01262 U. S. at 68.
"237 U. S. 19 (1915).
'THE FUTURE TRADING AcT of August 24, 1921, 42 STAT. 187, imposed a tax of twenty
cents per bushel on contracts for the sale of grain for future delivery, not made by
owners, etc., unless made on boards of trade approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.
In Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (May 15, 1922) the Supreme Court, in a suit brought
by members of the Chicago Board of Trade, enjoined enforcement of the act as not
within the taxing power because its purpose was "to.compel boards of trade to comply
with regulatio)ns, many of which can have no relevancy to the collection of the tax,"
and not within the commerce power because sales of futures were not commerce and it
did not appear that they interfered directly with interstate commerce.
Shortly after that decision, Congress passed a GRAIN FUTUREs ACT, 42 STAT. 998 (Sept.
21, 1922), which restricted transactions in futures to approved boards of trade, and
subjected them to regulations very similar to those of the FUTURE TRADING AcT, with
the important exception that the new statute imposed no tax. It contained an express
declaration that "speculation, manipulation and control" in the futures market were
producing "sudden and unreasonable fluctuations" in prices, and were "an obstruction to
and burden upon interstate commerce." In Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1
(1923), the Court, relying largely upon that congressional assertion, upheld this act
and denied the Chicago Board of Trade an injunction to restrain its enforcement. In
Trusler v. Crooks, 269 U. S. 475 (1926), the Court thereafter held unconstitutional the
collection of the tax imposed by the earlier act on an unauthorized option contract for
the sale of wheat for future delivery. The consideration paid for the option was $1 per
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VIII. CASES IN WHICH JUDICIAL SUPREMACY PROTECTED PRIVATE INCOMES,
GIFTS, AND INHERITANCES AGAINST TAXATION
(a) Incomne Tax Cases.
A Massachusetts probate judge paid, under protest, the federal income tax
upon his salary, under the laws of 1864 to 1867. He sued to recover the
tax. In Collector v. Day208 the Court, justice Bradley dissenting, affirmed
a judgment in his favor, on the ground that a federal tax upon the salary
of a state officer is an unwarranted interference with the State government.
The decision confers a special privilege upon state officers and employees.
To the extent that this privilege strengthens the bargaining position of states
in competing for services, and leads persons to prefer state employment to
other employment at the same salary, it promotes the interests of state govern-
ments, at the expense of the federal government; but this tendency is ob-
viously slight and, except in rare instances, without actual effect. Under
the present federal income tax law, for example, a married man with
two children pays no tax on the first $3300 of his income; and it follows
that most state salaries would not be taxed substantially, or at all, if the
Court permitted the government to tax them. It is highly improbable that
the judge who recovered $61.50 in the Day case would have preferred alterna-
tive employment and resigned his judgeship if he had been compelled to
pay the tax of about $16 a year from which the decision relieved him, and
which he would have had to pay if he had derived the same income from the
practice of law or other private employment. The notion that the economical
and efficient administration of state governments would have been prevented
if the federal government had been permitted to continue treating state
employment, for tax purposes, like other employment is as baseless as it
would be to suggest that the Standard Oil Company cannot be operated
economically and efficiently because its employees pay the same tax on their
salaries that is paid by other employees. No doubt a special tax upon state
employees would put the state at a disadvantage, but no special tax was at-
tempted. Moreover, when the Court decided, in the Day case, that the
United States could not impose a tax upon the income from a state office, it
had already laid down the converse proposition that a state cannot tax the
holding of a federal office. 20 9 Taking the two doctrines as a unit, whatever
trifling benefit they may confer upon either government, state or federal, as
thousand bushels, and the Court was clearly correct in saying that the tax of $200 per
thousand bushels "was not intended to produce revenue but to prohibit all such con-
tracts as part of the prescribed regulatory plan." 269 U. S. at 482. As the second act,
enforcement of which the Court refused to enjoin in the Olsen case, undertook to punish
unauthorized transactions with a fine of $10,000 and a year's imprisonment, the in-
validity of a prohibitive tax seems unimportant.
2011 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
"Dobbins v. Commr. of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435, 448 (U. S. 1842).
338 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
employer, is more than offset by the restrictions which they impose upon the
same government as a taxing power. The only beneficent effect, then, of the
doctrine of Collector v. Day is to confer an economic privilege upon a few of
the best-paid office holders.
A case of the greatest importance is Pollock v. Farmers Loan & Trusa
Co.210 The statute imposed a 2 per cent tax upon incomes, from whatever
source derived, with certain exceptions and a $4000 exemption. A stock-
holder in the defendant trust company sued to restrain the company from
paying the tax. On the original hearing, the Supreme Court decided that
the tax was unconstitutional with respect to the income from real estate,
as being "direct" and not apportioned among the states according to popula-
tion ;211 and also with respect to the income from municipal bonds, as being
an interference with the power of states to borrow money. On rehearing,
the Court held that the tax on income from personal property was also uncon-
stitutional, because "direct" and not apportioned, and that the entire income
tax law was therefore invalid. The Court was sharply divided in both cases.
Income taxes had previously been in force for many years, and had been
upheld by a unanimous court in Springer v. United States."2
The incidence of income taxes, in general, and of the one involved in
the Pollock case in particular, is not a matter of doubt. That tax fell, as
any income tax falls, upon the comparatively well-to-do and the rich. Ana-
tole France observed that the law is no respecter of persons, since it forbids
rich and poor alike to beg their bread or sleep under the bridges. The social
philosophy which he satirized was gravely expressed in Mr. Justice Field's
concurring opinion. The income tax "discriminates," he said, "between those
who receive an income of $4000 and those who do not. It thus vitiates, in
my judgment, by this arbitrary discrimination, the whole legislation."213
He did not realize that a given exaction from a man barely able to keep him-
self alive is a heavier burden than an exaction many times as great from a
man in easy circumstances. The Court lagged behind Congress, as legisla-
tures lag behind students of society, in recognizing that all men are not
created equal, and that when two people do the same thing, it is not the
same thing.
The advantage to the rich, and the baneful effect upon the poor, of Pollock
v. Farmers Loan and Trust Campan y 4 are evident from the change in the
federal tax structure which followed the recall of the decision, eighteen years
later, by the Income Tax Amendment. The sixteenth Amendment was ratified
-1157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601 (1895).
1U. S. CoxsT., Art. I, § 2.
m102 U. S. 586 (1880).
113157 U. S. at 596.
"'Warren lists the Pollock case among those the effect of which upon the country "can
be easily passed over" on the ground that it "was cured by the 16th Amendment". CON-
GRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE SUPREME COURT, p. 135.
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in 1913. "In 1913 . . . taxes on commodities in the country or at its ports.
yielded 94.6 per cent of all federal tax revenues. In 1930, taxes on personal
and corporation incomes yielded 66.5 per cent of all federal revenues. Taxes
on commodities provided only 29.5 per cent." 215 It is elementary that, as.
compared to the income tax, commodity taxes fall heavily on the relatively
poor. Although not all commodity taxes are wholly passed on to the con-
sumer, the tax is usually passed on. Although a poor man buys fewer commo-
dities than a rich man, he does buy commodities. The poor man, on the
other hand, escapes the income tax.
Only a small proportion of the people of the country are in the income-
tax class. In 1929, according to the Brookings Institution, "Nearly 6.
million families, or more than 21 per cent of the total, had incomes less than
$1000. About 12 million families, or more than 42 per cent, had incomes
less than $1500. Nearly 20 million families, or 71 per cent, had incomes less.
than $2500. Only a little over 2 million families, or 8 per cent, had incomes
in excess of $5000. About 600,000 families, or 2.3 per cent, had incomes
in excess of $10,000. '216 In 1929, the number of individuals who filed
income tax returns was 4,044,327, and of these only 2,458,049 were tax-
able.2 17 In 1932, 3,877,430 filed returns and 1,936,095 were taxable.218 The
burden of the income tax, then, falls wholly on a small and relatively well-
to-do minority. From that burden the Pollock case defended that minority
for many years.
Moreover, the Pollock case conferred its greatest benefit upon the most
prosperous, as it is upon them that the income tax imposes its greatest
burden. The concentration of income in the higher brackets, which are sub--
ject to mounting surtaxes, is great. In 1929 "the 11,653,000 families with
incomes of less than $1500 received a total of about 10 billion dollars. At
the other extreme, the 36,000 families having incomes in excess of $75,000,
possessed an aggregate income of 9.8 billion dollars. Thus it appears that
0.1 per cent of the families at the top received practically as much as 42 per
cent of the families at the bottom of the scale."2 19 The 42 per cent at the
bottom paid practically no income tax. The 0.1 per cent at the top paid a
great deal of income tax. Of the many millions of individuals whose in-
comes were less than $2000 in 1929, only 487,642 paid any federal income tax
'KENDRIcK, TAXATION ISSUES (1933) p. 25.
1"AMERICA's CAPACITY TO CONSUME, by MAURICE LEVEN, HAROLD G. MOULTON, and.
CLARK WARBURTON (The Brookings Institution, 1934) p. 55.
For this quotation, the statistics which follow, and other valuable suggestions, I am
indebted to Professor M. Slade Kendrick of the Department of Economics in Cornell'
University.
='STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1929 (U. S. Treasury Dept., Bureau of Internal Revenue),
p. 4.
'
1 STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1932 (U. S. Treasury Dept., Bureau of Internal Revenue4
p. 5.
1'AmERICA'S CAPACITY TO CONSUME, supra note 216, p. 56.
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whatever. Their total tax was $570,726, their average tax a little over one
dollar, and together they paid .07 per cent of the total income tax. The 20,-
224 individuals who reported incomes above $80,000 paid a total tax of
$707,765,592; their average tax was about $35,000, and together they paid
70.62 per cent of the total income tax.220
The sixteenth Amendment authorized Congress to "lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States . . . " The expectation that Congress could thereafter tax
everything within the popular understanding of "income" was disappointed.
The Income Tax Act of 1916221 provided that a stock dividend, made out of
the earnings or profits of a corporation, "shall be considered income, to the
amount of its cash value." The Standard Oil Company of California, with
a capital of some $50,000,000, distributed out of its earned surplus and un-
divided profits a stock dividend of 50 per cent. In Eisner v. Macomber,
2
the Court held that the Constitution forbade taxing this dividend to the
recipients, and a taxpayer recovered from the Collector of Internal Revenue
the $19,877 which she had paid. It was a direct tax; it was not appor-
tioned among the states; and, according to the Court, it was not a tax on
income. Four justices dissented. Mr. Justice Brandeis thought that the
decision enabled "the owners of the most successful businesses in America
. . . to escape taxation on a large part of what is actually their income."
223
Probably "so far as Eisnier v. Macomber turns on economic issues, the
majority has much the better of the argument" ;224 economists do not regard
stock dividends as income. Yet "no type of what is ordinarily considered as
income can be exempted from taxation without creating a sense of injustice
in the community. In common Wall Street parlance a stock dividend is
spoken of as 'cutting a melon'. '225  Obviously the decision saved the well-
to-do minority, in the long run, from a large amount of taxation. One
of its remote consequences is perhaps the recent federal legislation subjecting
undistributed corporate surpluses to taxation.226 Yet Eisner v. Macomber
has been gradually limited somewhat closely to its facts. It does not pro-
hibit the taxation as income of shares of a new company received in con-
nection with a reorganization ;227 nor, it has recently been declared, of shares
'Based on STATISTICS OF INCOME FOR 1929, supra note 217, pp. 61, 65.
139 STAT. 756, 757.
22 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
2252 U. S. at 237.
'Powell, Stock Dividends, Direct Taxes, and the Sixteenth Amendment (1920) 20
COL. L. REV. 536, 548.
'Seligman, Implications and Effects of the Stock Dividend Decision, (1921) 21 CoL.
L. REv. 313, 331.
'Act of June 22, 1936, c. 690 § 14, 49 STAT. 1655, 26 U. S. C. A. (Supp. 1936) § 13a.
'United States v. Phellis, 257 U. S. 156 (1921) ; Marr v. United States, 268 U. S.
536 (1925). The cases are discussed by Magill, Realization of Income through Cor-
porate Distributions (1936) 36 COL. L. REv. 519, 542 ff.
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of common voting stock received as a dividend on non-voting cumulative
preferred stock. "Where a stock dividend gives the stockholder an interest
different from that which his former stockholdings represented he receives
income." 22
In Evans v. Gore,220 a United States district judge sued to recover money
paid under protest as an income tax. Article III, Section 1, of the Con-
stitution provides that "the judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts"
shall receive "a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office". Although the sixteenth Amendment expressly author-
izes the taxation of "incomes, from whatever source derived," the majority of
the court held in effect that the earlier constitutional provision governed the
later; income derived by a United States judge as compensation from the
United States could not be taxed, as it would interfere with the independence
of the judiciary. Justice Holmes, in a dissent in which Justice Brandeis
joined, observed that "to require a man to pay the taxes that all other men
have to pay cannot possibly be made an instrument to attack his independence
as a judge." 230  To tax judicial salaries at a higher rate than other income
might conceivably have such an effect; but no such proposal was in issue.
It seems clear that the only interests which the decision served were those
of judges of the United States Courts, including the Supreme Court, in es-
caping taxation. The salaries of these judges range from $10,000 to $20,-
500.
The decision in Evans v. Gore "would seem to have no application to
judges appointed after the law taxing their income was first enacted. ' 1'2 But
in Miles v. Grahan 23 the Court held that the Constitution exempted from
income tax the salary of a Court of Claims judge who was appointed
after the passage of the tax law. Justice Brandeis dissented. So far
only as the Court of Claims itself it concerned, the case is in effect overruled
by Williams v. United States,2 33 which decided that that court is not con-
'KCoshland v. Helvering, 298 U. S. 441 (1936). The decision was that the dividend did
not constitute a partial return of capital to the shareholder, so as to reduce the cost to
him of his preferred shares and increase his profit on a sale of those shares.
For many years the Revenue Acts provided that "A stock dividend shall not be subject
to tax." 42 STAT. 227, 228 (1921) ; 48 STAT. 712 (1934) § 115 (f). Immediately after
the Koshland case, the Revenue Act of 1936 substituted a provision which reads in
part [§ 115 (f)]: "(1) General Rule. A distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders in its stock or in rights to acquire its stock shall not be treated as a
dividend to the extent that it does not constitute income to the shareholder within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution." 49 STAT. 1687, 26 U. S.
C. A. (Supp. 1936) § 115 (f).
='253 U. S. 245 (1920).
m id. at 265.
m Powell, Constitutional Law it 1919-20-Taxation (1920) 19 MIcH. L. REv. 117.
i 268 U. S. 501 (1925). For an account of subsequent statutory effort, probably in-
effectual, to obviate this decision, see PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL LAw HELD UNcONsTru-
TIONAL BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (Library of Congress, 1936)
p. 57.
=3289 U. S. 553 (1933).
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stituted under Article III, Section 1, of the Constitution and that it members
are, therefore, not covered by the ban against salary reductions. 28 4
Two income tax cases are discussed in the previous section of this article,
because of their relation to business enterprises. 2
35
(b) Inheritance and Gift Taxes
On June 27, 1907, Massachusetts adopted an inheritance tax statute,236 to
become effective on September 1, 1907. On July 29, 1907, a wealthy Massa-
chusetts couple transferred property worth several hundred thousand dollars
to trustees, without consideration. The trustees agreed to pay the income to
the settlors and the survivor, and then to distribute the fund among the
settlors' five children or their representatives. In addition to the motive
of parental affection and the financial necessities of some of the children,
"there was also a recognition of the fact that under the provisions of chapter
573 [563] of the Acts of 1907 the Massachusetts Legislature had provided
for a direct inheritance tax, which ... would become effective on September
1, 1907," and the settlors "were advised that gifts made to their children
previous to that date would not fall within the scope of the Act."2 7 After
the death of one of the settlors in 1921, the question arose whether the
amount then in the trust fund, some $432,000, was subject to a federal estate
tax under the Revenue Act of February 24, 1919,238 which directed the in-
clusion in gross estate of the value of all property "to the extent of any
interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer, or
with respect to which he has at any time created a trust, in contemplation of
or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death
(whether such transfer or trust is made or created before or after the pas-
sage of this Act), except in a case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration in
money or money's worth." The Supreme Court held that the trust property
'Booth v. United States, 291 U. S. 339 (Feb. 5, 1934), is technically outside the
limits of this article because of the date (June 6, 1933) of the attempt of Congress,
which the Court thwarted in that case, to reduce the salaries of "retired" United States
judges. As the Court pointed out, although the judges in question were nominally re-
tired, they could be and were called upon from time to time for judicial services.
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933), which is included in Warren's
list of cases overruling acts of Congress, overruled only an interpretation by the Comp-
troller General. The statute, in making a general reduction of government salaries,
expressly excepted "judges whose compensation may not under the Constitution be
diminished during their continuance in office." The Comptroller General was held to be
wrong in applying the reduction to the salaries of judges of the Court of Appeals, and
of the Supreme Court, of the District of Columbia.
"Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., supra note 195; National Life Insurance Co.
v. U. S., supra note 199.
"'C. 563.
'Agreed statement of facts (not quoted in the published report) in Coolidge v.
Loring, 235 Mass. 220 (1920).
'C. 18, § 402c, 40 STAT. 1097.
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was conveyed to the trustees "before the enactment in entire good faith
and without contemplation of death," and that the statute as applied to the
property in question was, therefore, "so arbitrary and capricious as to amount
to confiscation and offend the Fifth Amendment."' ' 9 As inheritance taxes
are levied only upon death, it would seem that one who contemplates avoid-
ing a state inheritance tax, as the settlors did, by hypothesis contemplates
death. It may be said in the Supreme Court's favor that it perhaps did not
have before it the admission of the settlors in Coolidge v. Loring, quoted
above, that one of their motives was the avoidance of the Massachusetts in-
heritance tax. It is none the less true that the only interests which were
actually and immediately protected by the decision in Nichols v. Coolidge
were the interests of a wealthy family in achieving, free of death tax, a trans-
fer undertaken in contemplation of death.
In February, 1924, a proposal to tax gifts was presented in Congress.
A conference report on the bill went to the Senate on May 22, 1924. On
May 23, one Untermeyer made a gift. By May 25, the tax bill had finally
passed both houses. The President approved it on June 2. In Untermeyer
v. Anderson,2 40 the Supreme Court, three justices dissenting, held that, as
tht gift was made before the bill became a law, the tax as applied to the
gift was "arbitrary" and therefore invalid under the due process clause of
the fifth Amendment. The retroactive features of income taxes, on the other
hand, have been repeatedly upheld. As Justice Brandeis pointed out in his
dissent, "For more than half a century, it has been settled that a law of
Congress imposing a tax may be retroactive in its operation . . . Each of
the fifteen income tax acts adopted from time to time during the last sixty-
seven years has been retroactive, in that it applied to income earned, prior to
the passage of the act, during the calendar year . . Some of the acts have
taxed income earned in an earlier year." 24' Solicitous as the Court has been to
protect income, which may or may not be earned, in the Untermeyer case
it showed a greater solicitude for gifts, which are by definition unearned.
The well-to-do persons who give or receive large gifts became the beneficaries
of a new principle. They not only may not be taxed on gifts, as one may
upon income, made before the tax is proposed; they may not even be taxed
upon gifts made during the last stages of the passage of the tax law. The
case would doubtless be followed so as to permit increases in the gift tax to
be similarly evaded.
The Court again protected gifts in Heiner v. Donnan.2 42 The Revenue
mNichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 542 (1927).
1276 U. S. 440 (1928).
m276 U. S. at 447, 448.
2285 U. S. 312 (1932). Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U. S. 352 (1932) is to
the same effect.
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Act of 1926243 provided that gifts, beyond the first $5000 to any one person,
made within two years prior to the death of the giver, should be "deemed and
held to have been made in contemplation of death," and should be included
in the decedent's gross estate subject to the death transfer tax. This provi-
sion was held to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As an
estate tax, the Court thought, it denied to the taxpayer the right to prove
facts, and as a gift tax it was unreasonably arbitrary. Justices Stone and
Brandeis dissented. They said, "The fact that such gifts, made shortly be-
fore death, regardless of motive, chiefly contribute to the withdrawal of prop-
erty from the estate tax, is enough to support the selections, even though
they are not conscious evasions of the estate tax, and opprobrious epithets
cannot certainly be applied to them.1 244 They cited many instances in which
wealthy persons had died shortly after making large gifts, and the govern-
ment had been unable to prove that the gifts were made in contemplation
of death. By the legislation which the court annulled in Heiner v. Donnan,
Congress had attempted to reach such gifts. "The fiscal necessities of the
government and the taxing temper of Congress are such that Heiner v
Donnan must appear to be the ill-timed posing of a riddle as to how an ad-
mittedly legitimate object of taxation may be taxed."2 45
IX. ADDITIONAL CASES IN WHICH JUDICIAL SUPREMACY PROTECTEI>
PROPERTY INTERESTS
The two cases now to be discussed constitute, together with Jones v. Mee-
han2 48 and Choate v. Trapp,.247 a small unclassified residue of instances in
which the action of the Supreme Court in overruling Congress protected
the interests of property owners.
In 1860, Hepburn made a note payable on February 20, 1862, to Griswold-
On February 25, 1862, during the Civil War, Congress passed the Legal
Tender Acts,2 48 which made United States notes legal tender in payment of
debts. In 1864 Hepburn tendered principal and interest in United States
notes, which were greatly depreciated in terms of specie. In 1870, in
Hepburn v. Griswold,249 the majority of the Court held that, as applied to
"§ 302a, 44 STAT. 9, 70.
'"285 U. S. at 340.
t;(1932) 41 YALE L. J. 907. Cf. (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 156; (1932) 32 COL. L. REv
1205.
"Infra note 257.
"AT224 U. S. 665 (1912). Because of the 5th Amendment and special status of Indians,
the Court held that Congress, after conferring upon lands allotted to Choctaws and
Chickasaws an immunity from taxation while the title remained in the original allottees,
could not withdraw the immunity so as to subject the lands in the hands of the allot-
tees to State taxation.
'C. 33, § 1, 12 STAT. 345.
""8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1870).
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debts created before its passage, the statute was not within the power "to
coin money, regulate the value thereof," and was unconstitutional. The de-
cision obviously was a great boon to creditors, and deprived borrowers,
i.e., the enterprising and the propertyless classes, of the protection which
Congress had sought to give them. It was welcomed by The Nation,
at that time an organ of conservative opinion. On February 17, 1870,
The Nation said: "Those who have read the opposing opinions of Chief
Justice Chase and Judge Miller on the legal tender case, must have
felt that whatever the defects in the reasoning of the former, or the awk-
wardness of his position in having to condemn on the bench what he had
actually done and tried to justify as Secretary of the Treasury, the moral
right was on his side . . . men ought to be made to pay what they agreed
and expected to have to pay." The direct effect of Hepburn v. Griswold was
limited to a little more than a year. It was decided by a vote of five to
three. Soon after, one member of the majority of the Court resigned and two
new judges were appointed; and a few months later, in the Legal Tender
Cases, 250 a divided court overruled Hepburn v. Griswold.251
A statute passed in 1863252 required claimants of captured or abandoned
property in the hands of the United States to make proof of their consistent
loyalty to the United States during the Civil War. A statute of 1870253
provided that no pardon or amnesty should be admissible to establish such a
claimant's right to sue, but that, on the contrary, the acceptance, without pro-
test, of a pardon which recited previous participation in the "rebellion"
should conclusively disqualify a claimant both in the Court of Claims and
on appeal. One Wilson, after supporting the Confederacy, had come within
the terms of a presidential amnesty; and the Court of Claims, before the
passage of the Act of 1870, had given judgment in favor of his administra-
tor for the price of certain cotton abandoned to the United States during the
war. In United States v. Klein,254 the Supreme Court affirmed this judg-
ment, and held that the provisions of the Act of 1870 were unconstitutional
interferences with judicial power, as prescribing the decision of cases, and
with the executive power as limiting the force of pardons. The claim upon
which the plaintiff recovered was for $125,300. It is obvious that persons
who had claims against the government large enough to be worth suit, togeth-
er with the means to sue, had been more prosperous than the average; but
many of the beneficiaries of United States v. Klein had lost their property in
-'12 Wall. 457, 528, 553 (U. S. 1870).
'In the Legal Tender Cases, 110 U. S. 421 (1884), it was decided that Congress might
pass a valid legal tender act even in time of peace.
112 STAT. 820.
116 STAT. 235.
'13 Wall. 128 (U. S. 1871).
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the Civil War. This decision, together with Ex parte Garland,5  Twtices-
v. Murray,2 56 and the cases which annulled pro-Negro legislation make up a
group which tended somewhat to cushion the shock of the war and recon-
struction in the South.
CONCLUSION
To repeat, with motives, and with the relative reasonableness of conflict-
ing congressional and judicial views on vague standards like interstate com-
merce and due process, this paper is not concerned. It is concerned only with
the practical effects and tendencies of judicial supremacy. The discussion
might be expanded by considering acts of Congress which the Supreme Court
has upheld against attack. But apart from the period of uncertainty which
precedes the decision, judicial supremacy produces, in connection with a
statute which is upheld, nO effect whatever, since the statute would neces-
sarily be upheld if there were no such thing as judicial supremacy. Some
of the cases in which the Supreme Court has annulled state legislation have
had more effect than many in which it has annulled acts of Congress. But
cases involving state legislation, besides being too many to be treated in an
article, are foreign to the subject of this one. The supremacy of courts over
state legislatures and the supremacy of courts over Congress stand on dif-
ferent ground. If the one sort of control is a practical necessity, it does not
follow that the other is; and if the one sort has protected certain interests
it does not follow that the other has protected like interests. In the control
of state legislation there have been deviations, including certain free speech
cases, from the pattern of the federal cases. What should be done about the
one sort of control and what should be done about the other are dif-
ferent questions.
Exhaustive investigation would reveal more than this brief inquiry about
the effects of many of the decisions. It might modify the views expressed
here regarding some of them. It is unlikely that it would seriously qualify
the conclusions which follow.
Of the pre-New Deal cases in which the Supreme Court annulled acts of
Congress,257 one group protected mistreatment of colored people; another
'Supra note 52.
'Supra note 26.
.In general, it has been assumed that Warren's list of these decisions [CoNrRESS, TEE
CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT (1935) pp. 304 ff.] is complete. All the
cases involving pre-New Deal statutes which he cites, plus the Knight case, 156 U. S. 1,
have been considered, except the following unimportant cases:
(1) Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160 (U. S. 1868).
A statute of 1812, 2 STAT. 677, authorized a board to re-examine land titles which
had been confirmed pursuant to an earlier statute. The board made a report adverse
to a patentee, and "the government by its proper officers" sold the land at public sale.
The new purchaser brought ejectment against the successor of the patentee. The
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group protected businesses or business methods hurtful to the majority;
another, comprising employers' liability, workmen's compensation, mini-
nium wage, child labor, and union membership cases, protected owners
of business at the direct expense of labor; another protected owners of
business against taxation; another protected the recipients of substantial
incomes, gifts, and inheritances against taxation; and other cases protected
the interests of property owners in other ways. Not many cases of any im-
portance fall outside these catagories. A few decisions were approximately
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the defendant. As the statute had directed,
not the nullification of titles, but merely an inquiry and report concerning them, the
court's statement that Congress had no power to nullify them was dictum. Obviously
its tendency was favorable to the propertied group.
(2) The Alicia, 7 Wall. 571 (U. S. 1868).
An application was made by all the parties in interest, in a prize case pending in a
Circuit Court, for its transfer to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the statute
permitting transfer under such circumstances, 13 STAT. 311 (1864), was unconstitu-
tional, on the ground that the Constitution allows the Supreme Court in prize cases appel-
late jurisdiction only.
(3) Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (1911).
"Congress conferred on named Indians the privilege of suing in the Court of Claims
to determine the constitutionality of a prior Act of Congress. There was no evidence
that the Indians named had any personal interest in the matter, that any property of
theirs could be affected by the decision, or that any party or officer had any adverse
interest. The elements of an adversary proceeding involving plaintiffs' or defendants'
interests were lacking." BORCHrARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934) p. 279. The
Court held that no "case" or "controversy" was involved, and directed the Court of
Claims to dismiss. In Liberty Warehouse v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927), the Court
relied in part on the Muskrat case in refusing to render a declaratory judgment pur-
suant to a Kentucky statute. Professor Borchard points out that the Muskrat case is
entirely distinguishable from actions for a declaratory judgment.
(4) Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559 (1911).
The Enabling Act under which Oklahoma was admitted as a state forbade removal of
the state capital before 1913. The state legislature moved the capital prematurely. Tax-
payers who owned property at the old site sought to prevent the removal. The court
held that Oklahoma would not be a "State", or admitted to the union, if unable to move
its capital, and that its admission therefore invalidated the restriction. While property
owners at the old site were denied protection, those at the new site received protection.
(5) Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923). A statute (37
STAT. 938, 988, c. 150, § 8) authorizes appeal from the Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia to the United States Supreme Court in valuation and rate proceedings
which originated in the local Public Utilities Commission. The court held that the
statute attempted to confer upon the court legislative or administrative jurisdiction and
was therefore invalid.
The list recently published by the Library of Congress, PRovIsIoNs OF FEDERAL LAW
HELD UNcONsTITUTIONAL 3Y THE SUPRxME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1936), in-
cludes the following two non-New Deal cases which are not in Warren's list (one of
which is too recent).
Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1 (1899). Congress by joint resolution (28 STAT. 1018,
1894) sought to validate a lease of land to A, made by an Indian who had previously
leased it to B. In a suit between the two lessees, brought to quiet title, the court held
the resolution unconstitutional.
United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S. 287 (1935). The REvENUE ACT OF 1926
(44 STAT. 95 § 701) imposed a "special excise tax of $1000" on liquor dealers carrying
on business in violation of State or municipal laws and a "penalty" of $1000 for carrying
on the business without paying the tax. The Court, three Justices dissenting, held that
the "penalty" could not be enforced after the repeal of the 18th Amendment. Although
this case was decided in 1935, it is within the limits of this article because the statute
was passed before 1933.
348 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
neutral in their incidence as between different social groups. Rich and poor
were given theoretically equal assurance that for various offenses they must
be indicted before they are tried, and must be tried by a jury of twelve. But
few persons ever find themselves in a position to be affected by such decisions,
and any benefit which they may confer is uncertain, slight, and probably
less equal in practice than in theory. Moreover, the statutes which those deci-
sions annulled were limited to Chinese, to Alaska, or to the District of Colum-
bia, and there is no reason to assume that their principle would have been ex-
tended, as the principle of the minimum wage would obviously have been ex-
tended, if its local application had been upheld. There is not a case in the
entire series which protected the "civil liberties" of freedom of speech, press,
and assembly; on the contrary, over the protest of Holmes and Brandeis, the
Espionage Act was not merely upheld but extended by the Court.258 There is
not one which protected the right to vote; on the contrary, congressional at-
tempts to protect the voting rights of Negroes were defeated by the Court.
There is not one which protected the vital interests of the working majority
of the population in organizing or in wages; on the contrary, congressional
efforts to protect those interests were frustrated by the Court.
So much is objective, more or less. Subjectively, according to one's social
philosophy, it may follow that judicial supremacy over Congress is good, bad,
or indifferent. The cult of "the Constitution", which contemplates chiefly
this power of the courts, illustrates the connection between conventional
standards and the interests of dominant groups. In one who identifies
the country with the well-to-do minority of its population, enthusiasm for
judicial control over Congress is as logical as enthusiasm can be. It is
hard to see why, apart from convention, one who does not make that identi-
fication should share that enthusiasm. When a legal scholar says, "I am
for continuance of the Supreme Court's power of review. I think that it has
proved its worth .... I think that over the long haul the Court has done a
superb job," 259 I wonder what cases seem to him so valuable as to out-
weigh the Dred Scott case, which helped to entrench slavery; the Civil Rights
and related cases, which protected the oppression of Negroes; the employ-
ers' liability and workmen's compensation cases, which denied relief to injured
workmen; the child labor and minimum wage cases, which protected the hiring
of women and children at starvation wages; the income tax cases, which pre-
vented the shifting of tax burdens from the poor to the rich; and the many
minor instances in which the Court's review has done harm to common men.
mAbrams v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
'"Llewellyn, Proposed Amendment (Feb. 1937), SuRvY GRAPHIC p. 89. The quoted
statements refer to the Court's review of all legislation, state and federal. Llewellyn
would, however, forbid annulment by less than two-thirds of the Court's members.
